GENERAL McCLELLAN'S

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

Review of the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War relative to the Peninsula Campaign,

BY

HIRAM KETCHUM,

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

COUNSELLOR AT LAW.

1864.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The following numbers were published in the Journal of Commerce through seve successive months, ending in May, 1864, under the signature of the Author. They we designed to show that the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War had do great injustice to MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. By request the numbers are now collected and published in pamphlet form, and the Author asks for the an attentive perusal, and a candid and impartial judgment.

HIRAM KETCHUM.

May 16, 1864.

973.75
K49g

REVIEW OF McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN.

The Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives on the conduct of the war have made an elaborate report, a part of which is calculated, probably intended, to impair public confidence in the military capacity of General McClellan. A report from a committee derived from so high a source as the Legislative Department of the government will, as it ought, command public attention, and influence to some extent the mind of the country. The publication of that report preceded, by some days, and even weeks, the publication of the evidence upon which it professes to be founded. The report has been published in many newspapers, and is industriously circulated in a pamphlet form. The opponents of General McClellan ought to be satisfied with the influence to his discredit which this document was diffusing, specially as he has not interposed one word to counteract that influence, and check its progress. The general has observed his characteristic silence; yet his persecutors are not content with the amount of influence already enlisted against him, but are constant and persevering in their efforts to destroy him. The New York Times, published yesterday, Friday, has a long and bitter article, in which, strangely enough, it resorts to rebel testimony taken from the Richmond Whig, to depreciate the military character of Gen. McClellan. Would the Times be willing to admit testimony in favor of his high military character from the same source? Such testimony the Times well knows is at hand, but I will not use it.

Now I have read the testimony annexed to the report of the War Committee with some care, and in my opinion that testimony, in connection with well known facts of public notoriety, does not authorize the conclusions, unfavorable to Gen. McClellan, made public by the committee in their report. It is evident to my mind that there is a concerted, a party effort, aided by the government, to pervert the truth, and by such perversion to destroy General McClellan. This effort shall not succeed if my opposition, in concert with other, can defeat it. When I see a combination of the strong against the weak, an exercise of the vast power and influence of the government against an individual citizen who is innocent of any offence against that government, my sympathies in every such case are with the weaker party, and in the present case, whatever of power and influence I can exert, by the open use of my own name, and such reputation and character as I happen to possess in a city where I have lived for more than fifty years, shall be put forth without fear and without stint to accomplish a fair administration of justice in the case under consideration.

I intend, with permission, through the columns of the Journal of Commerce, to submit, with as much brevity as is consistent with clear elucidation, a fair and impartial examination of the material points connected with the operations of General McClellan, brought out by the evidence before the War Committee. There are very few persons that have that evidence at command, for it is very voluminous. The newspapers could not be expected to publish the whole of it, but in making selections they might manage to be impartial. Especially those who condemn McClellan ought to publish his testimony, but this they refuse to do.

NO. II.

My first proposition, which I mean to prove to the entire satisfaction of every reasonable man, is this:

If General McClellan's plan had not been interfered with; his plan settled and, concurred in by the government before he left Washington for

52746

the peninsula, he would have captured Richmond certainly as early as the month of June 1862.

The evidence in support of this proposition, to which I invite the candid and careful attention of the reader, shall now be given.

The testimony of Prince de Joinville, under his own name, was not drawn forth by the committee, but it was given to Europe and the world, and must have been known to the committee. This was the testimony of a highly intelligent witness, who communicated the truth of what he knew himself, and none can question his truthfulness and impartiality. In quoting from the Prince's statement, I shall have to reproduce what has lately appeared in the editorial columns of the Journal of Commerce. When Gen. McClellan went to Yorktown, he had no thought of besieging that position. The siege of that place was rendered necessary by causes entirely unforeseen, and unexpected by the general. He had made ample provision for the turning of that position. Prince de Jonville says (page 41): "The enemy held the James with the Merrimac and his gunboats; the York was closed by the Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries. Nevertheless, by a disembarkation on the Severn, beyond Gloucester, he might carry the latter position, and open the way of the Federal gunboats into the York River. A subsequent movement up the left bank, in the direction of West Point, would put us so far in the rear of the army charged with the defence of the lines of Yorktown that it would have been in a most perilous position. This accomplished, the Confederates must have abandoned Gloucester, and fallen back hastily upon Richmond. The execution of this *coup de main* had been left to a corps of the army commanded by Gen. McDowell. This corps was to be the last to embark at Washington, and it was calculated that it ought to reach Yorktown in a body on its transports at the moment when the rest of the army, moving by land, should appear before that post from Fortress Monroe." The Prince proceeds: "Instead of finding it, we received the inexplicable and as yet unexplained intelligence that this corps, 35,000 strong, had been sent to another destination. *The news was received in the army with stupefaction*, although the majority could not foresee the deplorable consequences of a step taken, it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but certainly with inconceivable recklessness. . . . *This step, taken when it was, deranged a whole system of machinery fairly a work.*"

Here then, when the army was b fore Yorktown, and before the idea a siege had entered any man's hea was a sore disappointment. One the foundations upon which the hop nay, almost certainty, of speedy su cess had been reared, was suddenl unexpectedly removed by a pow which the leader of the army cou not control. Let us pause here for single moment to consider what t present position and fame of this co mander would be at this moment his just expectations had not bee cruelly disappointed; but what is infinitely more consequence, what, this time, would have been the po tion of our country but for this fa step! But disappointments do n stop here. After the siege of Yor town, and after the army had reach the front of Richmond, another opportunity was supplied by the vigilance and skill of the commanding general to retrieve the great error of the past and to capture Richmond. By the command of Gen. McClellan, Gen. Fitz John Porter, with a portion of our army, marched in a furious storm to Hanover Court House, twenty miles north of Richmond, routed the enemy, some 8,000 or 10,000 strong, killed 200, took 700 prisoners, and captured one piece of artillery. The victory was gained on the 26th day of May. The advance guard of McDowell, says Prince de Joinville, "was then at Bowling Green, fifteen miles from that of Porter. It needed only an effotr of the will; the two armies were united, and the possession of Richmond

certain! Alas! this effort was not made. I cannot," says he, "recall these fatal moments without a real sinking of heart."

What loyal man in the country does not at this day join in the lament of the illustrious stranger? Here then another opportunity was lost to secure the great object of the peninsular campaign. It has long since been admitted that if this opportunity had been improved, Richmond must have been taken, and in that case McClellan would have been the idol of his country, for the rebellion against that country would have been crushed. Was it any fault of this general that the opportunity was not improved? Certainly not. Yet what man in the country has suffered so severely for the failure to seize an opportunity for certain success, which his sagacity as a military leader had created? Yet his sufferings bear no comparison to those of his beloved country, and I doubt not he grieves far less for himself, for the loss of immortal renown, than for that country. The Prince de Joinville adds:

"Not only did the two armies unite, but the order came from Washington, to burn the bridges which had been seized. This was the clearest way of saying to the army of the Potomac, and to its chiefs, that in no case could they count on the support of the armies of Upper Virginia." This statement of De Joinville is substantially confirmed by evidence given before the joint committee. General Franklin testifies at page 625 that the primary cause of the failure of the peninsula campaign was "*the detachment of McDowell's corps from the army of the Potomac, at the particular time it was detached. I think the detachment of that corps left General McClellan on the peninsula with all his plans disarranged.*" Franklin was not questioned further on this point, but the committee immediately changed the course of inquiry. The question which called forth the above answer was put by Mr. Odell, and seemed quite accidental. General Henry J. Hunt, chief in command of the Artillery of the Potomac, was a witness before the committee. He yet remains in the army of the Potomac, and is, I am informed, much relied upon, not only as an officer of great skill in his line of duty, but confided in as an intelligent, truthful man, receiving the respect of his brother officers.

Gen. Hunt fully concurs in the statement above quoted from De Joinville. The general says, (page 571):

"As I understood it, McDowell's corps, which was the last to embark, was to move across to West Point, or near to that place, a portion of it touching at Gloucester, so as to throw itself between the enemy's works at Yorktown and Richmond. Of course the withholding of that corps prevented the plan, if that was the plan, from being executed as intended." He further says: "The next cause for the failure of that campaign was this: I think if a junction of all our forces had been made after the battle of Hanover Court House, *we should have made a sure thing of it.*"

Thus then it is made manifest by the testimony and statements above referred to, that if General McClellan's plans had been executed, Richmond would have fallen. I can find nothing in Part I. of the committee's Report, containing 754 pages of printed matter, to countervail this testimony. Now I confidently submit to every candid reader, was not General McClellan entitled to the benefit of this fact in the report of the committee.? It might have been impracticable for the government to furnish the means promised, but even that should not have deprived him of the credit of having conceived and adopted those plans. It might be, that though his original plans were interfered with, and frustrated by those in authority over him, yet still the plans were creditable, as their execution was certain to lead to success.

In my future numbers I shall investigate, first, whether there were good and satifactory reasons for not allowing General McDowell's command to render the service which it was to perform; and second, whether, not-

withstanding the abstraction of that command, General McClellan ought to have taken Richmond. The object of this paper is to show that the general's plans were right.

It appears by the evidence, as shown in my last number, that Richmond would have been taken a year ago, if Gen. McClellan had received the aid promised by the government. If there is any fallacy in the argument which reaches this conclusion, let it be shown. I do not stop to notice the theory of Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock; to that I may hereafter return, only remarking that the theory is a discovery of the General himself; he would be entitled, upon application, to receive a patent for it, *as new*, but it might fail of the other qualification required in a patentable discovery, that is in being *useful*.

The aid promised and withheld was the co-operation of Gen. McDowell's command. That this co-operation was promised and not given, are facts uncontradicted. The justification alleged for keeping back this command is, that it was required for the protection of Washington. Let us see how far this justification is supported by the evidence.

At the time when, contrary to public expectation, Gen. McDowell did not march to the assistance of the army on the Peninsula, he was much censured; but it now appears, from his full and apparently candid testimony before the committee, that such censure was unjust. From that testimony we learn that McDowell's command was the last to be embarked for the Peninsula, that the corps first sent down should have nothing to do with his comand, which was to go beyond Yorktown, while the first should go and threaten Yorktown. But after Gen. McClellan had moved with the army to Fortress Monroe, and written to McDowell that his corps should be the last to move, the President became apprehensive that if his command should go down below, the enemy might take advantage of the defenceless condition of Washington, and while our forces were going against Richmond, they might come against Washington. The President therefore ordered that McDowell's force should remain for the defence of the capital; it did not move to Yorktown as promised. General McDowell testifies without reservation, that he personally used no influence, nor in any way sought to be detached from Gen. McClellan's command. He remained to act purely on the defensive, for the defence of the capital. He afterwards, upon inquiry of the Secretary of War, ascertained that it would be within the scope of his defensive instructions to go to Fredericksburg. At Fredericksburg he could act for the defence of the capital. This was a decision of the War Department; *let not this decision be forgotten.* In accordance with this decision, McDowell went down opposite Fredericksburg, and afterwards, by permission of the War Department, put a small force, merely for a defensive purpose, across the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg. After lying some time in that city, the Gen. received information that the President intended to give nim authority to move down upon Richmond whenever Gen. Shield's division should join him. This division did join him, and the two generals were upon the eve of moving towards Richmond when a telegram came announcing the raid of the rebel general Jackson up the Shenandoah Valley. Thus it is related in Mc-Dowell's testimony:

"The President, or Secretary of War in the name of the President, telegraphed to send a division up after Jackson. I did so, although I replied that *it was a crushing blow to us all.* The President ordered another brigade to move up there, and then another brigade, and then another regiment. And finally the President put the question to me in this way—if I did not think that, as the department commander, it was my duty to be here in Washington. I replied that I had not so thought, or I should certainly have been here; that I thought my presence was most required down below, but as there was a doubt upon

the matter I would come up. I had hoped that I should not be diverted from going to Richmond."

Gen. McDowell also informed the President, in answer to that telegram: "While I should be too late to effect any good up there, I should lose the opportunity of doing any good down below."

Just here let it be noted that Gen. McClellan testifies: "When I heard of the advance of Jackson upon Gen. Banks, I telegraphed to the President that I believed the intention to be simply to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. I had no idea it meant a serious threat upon Washington."

It is thus evident, without referring to other testimony, that General McDowell desired that his command should, in the first instance, go to Yorktown, and secondly that he should march from Fredericksburg to Richmond. As military men, McClellan and McDowell concurred in judgment as to the steps to be taken for the capture of Richmond. The alarm of the President for the safety of Washington prevented the taking of these steps. The next inquiry is,—was there any foundation for this alarm? This inquiry shall be pursued in my next.

The question now to be discussed is, Could McClellan have been sent to Richmond without endangering the safety of Washington? We have seen Generals McClellan and McDowell concur in the opinion that it could. The question was one to be decided by military men. I cannot find that this question was put by the committee to any witness, who from his military knowledge and experience was presumed capable of giving a reliable opinion—the opinion of an expert. The question should have been thus framed:—"Suppose the command of General McDowell was necessary to assure the taking of Richmond, could it have been sent either to Yorktown when McClellan went to that place, or afterwards to Hanover Court House to unite with Porter, without endangering the capital?" What must have been the answer to that question? In the first place, the strength of the enemy, and the force at his command, which under all the circumstances, he would probably bring against the capital, would have been considered. The command of McDowell, say 35,000 strong, it was proposed to send to Richmond. If it had been sent, the fact would have been well known to the enemy, and this would have compelled him to employ a larger force to defend Richmond. We know from reliable testimony that the enemy expected the junction of McDowell and Porter on the 26th of May, and McDowell's failure to come was ascribed by the enemy to a treasonable omission of duty on his part. The junction of those two commands would in the judgment of the enemy have resulted in the capture of Richmond. The testimony of the Prussian officer, then in the rebel service at Richmond, may be relied on for this statement. Assuming, then, that McDowell had moved down to Richmond, what force could the rebels have spared to assail Washington? Certainly not a large one, probably none at all. Then, secondly, what were the resources of the government for the defence of Washington, if McDowell's 35,000 troops had been sent to Richmond? I aver, without fear of contradiction, that if when McClellan went down to Fortress Monroe in March, 1862, or at any other time up to the first of June in that year, the President had seen fit to write the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, throwing out all the other loyal New England States, and New Jersey, that he had been obliged to send away so large a force to assist in the capture of Richmond, that fifty thousand men would be required in the fortifications at Washington to make a perfect defence of the capital, that number, most of them well disciplined, well drilled, and well appointed troops, would have been in the capital in less than ten days from the date of the call, ready for immediate service. I know that 10,000 of this number from the city

of New York alone would have responded to such a call in less than one week. There did come a call for troops from the War Department in the latter part of May. It was received by the 7th on the 26th day of that month, the day before the capture of Hanover Court House, in the evening of that day, Sunday, and on Tuesday morning this regiment, fully armed and equipped, fit for immediate service, was in Baltimore; the 22nd New York was there the next day, and several other regiments followed within a few days, when there came an order countermanding the call for troops, much to the disappointment and chagrin of other regiments in this city desirous and eager to march. It was not in this city only, but in Boston and elsewhere, that this disappointment was felt. I have spoken of troops not actually in the field, whose services could have been commanded by the government in an emergency for the defence of the capital. Let us now see what troops were, at the time when Gen. McClellan left Washington, actually in the service for this purpose. In his examination before the Committee on the conduct of the War, the following question was put to General McClellan:—"When you took the army to the Peninsula, how many troops were left for the defence of Washington; where were they stationed, and by whom were they commanded?" To which he gave the following answer:—"There has been published a letter which I wrote on board the steamer Commodore, on the first day of April last (1862), to the Adjutant General, giving the number of troops left and their stations. The numbers there given were furnished to me by my adjutant general, from the latest and most authentic returns in his possession. I recollect that the aggregate was something over 70,000, but I cannot give the details." This statement was also testified to by Gen. McClellan before the McDowell Court of Inquiry. I am aware that General E. A. Hitchcock professed, in his testimony, before the committee, to be much "amazed and shocked at the testimony of General McClellan, because he included in this number of 70,000 not only the number in Washington, but also those troops employed to guard the approaches by the enemy to the capital, though stationed and acting at some distance from it. In the judgment of General Hitchcock, a force could not act for the defence of the capital unless posted in Washington, or on the opposite shore of Virginia, or somewhere in the immediate vicinity. Gen McClellan took a different view of defensive forces; he included all those, wherever stationed, whose object was to intercept advances upon the capital, from which quarter soever those advances might be anticipated. If for instance, an advance on the city of New York was expected from an enemy in Canada, it might well be that a force posted at Albany, 160 miles distant, could act for the defence of this city. It was as I have shown, the decision of the War Department that General McDowell was acting within the scope of his orders to protect Washington, although his command was actually at Fredericksburg. The idea of General McClellan evidently was that all troops occupying and guarding the avenues leading to the capital, through which, or some of them, the enemy was expected to approach and assail the capital, in situations where they could be easily rallied to the capital itself, might, with propriety, be called troops for the defence of the capital. Who can dispute the soundness of this view? To show the actual location of those forces, I will transcribe the letter of the general, referred to in his answer above quoted. The letter is contained in the report of the committee.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, STEAMER COMMODORE, April 1, 62.
Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, Adj. Gen, U.S. A.

General:—I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War.

The approximate numbers and po-

sitions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are about as follows.

Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men; other disposable troops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about 11,400 men.

The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it it designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas.

Gen. Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Col. Geary at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery.

I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guard above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of Gen. Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men.

It is my design to push Gen. Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination.

The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus (including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery; Banks' 5th corps, which embraces 41 guns, some 3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guard, about 2,000 men) amount to about 35,468 men.

It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say, 850 men, being with some 500 cavalry, 3,350 men on the Lower Potomac.

To recapitulate—

At Warrenton there is to be -	7,780	men.
At Manassas, say - - - - -	10,859	"
In the Valley of the Shenandoah	35,859	"
On the Lower Potomac - - -	1,350	"
In all - - -	55,456	

There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000 men, inclusive of the batteries under instruction.

The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at Washington subject to disposition where their services may be required.

I am, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
GEO B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

This topic shall be pursued in my next number.

I have shown, and the Committee on the conduct of the War had sufficient evidence before them to prove, that there was no cause for the alarm exhibited by the President, which kept him from sending McDowell's command to Yorktown, or to Hanover Court House. That this alarm was really felt by the President, I am bound to believe. The question now is, who awakened this feeling of apprehension? Who is responsible for it? I have no doubt that Generals James S. Wadsworth and E. A Hitchcock are the persons.

On the 21st day of April, 1862, Gen. Wadsworth made a report to the Secretary of War; the next day he testified before the committee and verified the accuracy of his report. This document states the number of men left under his command for the defence of Washington, to be 19,022 present for duty. This does not differ materially from Gen. McClellan's letter above copied; but the essential difference between these reports is this, one

states only the number of troops in a very limited command, while the other defines the number, in other far more extensive commands, all for the defence of Washington. The President was led to believe that Wadsworth's 19,022 troops was the aggregate force left for the defence of the capitol. He says in a communication to Gen, McClellan dated April 9, 1862, "Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction, to this city, [Washington] to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade." Thus, it is proved that the President was fully possessed with the idea that there was no force for the defence of the capital but that reported to be under General Wadsworth. He supposed the whole line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to Washington to be entirely open, and that the enemy on that line would encounter no resistance except from Wadsworth's command. No wonder he felt some apprehension. It seems impossible that the President could ever have seen McClellan's letter dated April 1, then on file in the War Department. From that report he would have learned that at Manassas and Warrenton almost in front of Washington, and directly on the line to Richmond there were besides those under Wadsworth's, 18,639 troops, and twelve guns, or 36,639 men and 44 field guns directly applicable to the defence of Washington, without counting the 1,350 men on the lower Potomac, who could also have been drawn in if an attack was imminent. Besides all this there were 35,467 troops and 65 guns in the Shenandoan Valley ready to move to the defence of Washington if necessary. There were in fact all told 77,500 men and 103 field guns for the defence of Washington and its approaches, without counting the force under Gen. Dix at Baltimore, which amounted to ten regiments and two battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and five batteries. These numbers are from official returns.

Gen. Wadsworth testifies before the War Committee that he had within his jurisdiction "*everything for the defence of Washington,*" and further testifies that the total amount of men present for duty under his command was 19,022. The general evidently left the impression upon the minds of the Committee that these troops were the sole reliance for the defence of the capital; the same impression must have been received by the President, and contributed to the delusion under which his mind labored. Wadsworth's report was brought to his attention, and, basing his suggestion upon this report, Hitchcock intimated to the Secretary of War that McClellan had left the capital defenceless; that he had violated his orders, and rendered himself responsible for all the consequences. Here was a mare's nest. Hitchcock says:—"When this state of things became known to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, he required General Thomas and myself to make a report upon the execution of the President's order, the letter of Gen. McClellan of the 1st April, the report of General Wadsworth of the 2d April, and one or two other papers requiring us *to give an opinion whether Gen. McClellan had complied, or not, with the requirements of the order of the President.*" Who made this state of things known to the Secretary of War? General Hitchcock himself, doubtless. A court of inquiry, in fact, though not in name, was thus instituted to report whether or not McClellan had obeyed orders. All that a court of inquiry has power to do, is to inquire and report to the power appointing it.

That court made a report to the War Department. Hitchcock testifies: "The report went of course to the President, and, on the next day, if I mistake not, the 31 of April, the President came to the war office and held quite a long conversation with the chiefs of the various bureaus of the War Department, the Secretary of War being present. At the conclusion of that consultation the President himself ordered that one of the Corps

of the Army of the Potomac which were then in front of Washington should be detained for the defence of the capital. The selection was left with the Secretary of War who designated the Corps commanded by McDowell. I will mention," says Hitchcock, "that Gen. McDowell himself was not present, and I believe knew nothing of the steps which led to his detention here until after the order was issued. As soon as General McClellan heard of this he complained of it. He wished the whole of McDowell's Corps sent to him."

Now I call upon every officer of the army, and upon every American citizen to give his attention for a brief space of time to the scenes here described.

George B. McClellan, a young general with little experience in actual service, without any solicitation on his part, is called by his government to a post of the highest responsibility. He is placed in command of the largest army by far ever brought together in his native land, an army organized for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection the most formidable the world has ever beheld, an insurrection which threatened the overthrow of the government, and the extinction of popular liberty. At a distance from the capital; in the very face of the enemy, anxious beyond all expression for success; excited and agitated by the consciousness that the eyes of his country, and the whole civilized world are eagerly fastened upon him, scanning and criticising all he does, and all he leaves undone. This is one scene in the drama. Now turn to another. At the capital of his country this same young commander, in his absence is charged with having disobeyed the order of his superior in command, in neglecting to secure the safety of that capital against an invading foe; a grave offence. A court or commission of inquiry is instituted before which he has no notice to appear, of its very existence he is not apprised. Ignorant of any charge brought against him, with no counsel or friend to speak for, or defend him, he is tried before the court, a report condemning him is brought in. The President and all the officials of the War Department are assembled to hear and cogitate upon this report; the Commander-in-Chief approves of it and passes sentence upon the absent accused. The stiletto has been thrust into his back, and he is ignorant of the assault until he finds himself fainting from the loss of blood. That sentence is that he shall be denied the co-operation of a corps which had been promised him, and which he deemed essential to success, because he had violated express directions in neglecting the safety of the capital.

Now let us see whether General McClellan was in truth guilty of the charge preferred against him. The charge was that he had violated an order "that Washington should be perfectly secure." But who shall say in what "security" consists? The President says: "My explicit directions that Washington should, *in the judgment of all the commanders of corps*, be left entirely secured, had been entirely neglected." The *commanders of corps* were therefore made sole judges of what was required for security. These commanders were Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, Mc Dowell and Sumner. They were absent, with the exception of McDowell, on the peninsula, with McClellan. We have seen what McDowell's opinion was. All these commanders of corps were examined before the War Committee, but none of them was asked whether he considered the forces actually left by Gen. McClellan, sufficient to ensure the safety of the capital. The testimony of neither of them was before Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, and there is little doubt that every one of them would have admitted the force, actually left there, to be sufficient to secure the safety of Washington. There was therefore no authority for the decision that in the judgment of commanders of corps Washington was left unsafe.

General Hitchcock testified that Gen. McClellan complained of that de-

cision made in the office of the Secretary of War on the 3d of April. Yes, he did complain: his letter to the President is in the following words:

NEAR YORKTOWN, April 5, 7 1-2. P.M

"The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoisance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the entire peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being reinforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the first corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy, and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but whatever your decision may be. I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. G. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General.

A LINCOLN, President.

This letter speaks for itself, it needs no comment.

The report and testimony of Gen. James S. Wadsworth might be subjected to severe animadversion. His statements are contradicted by reliable testimony. The report of Col. William B. Green to General Barry, Inspector of Artillery, has been extensively published. It shows conclusively the gross inaccuracy of General Wadsworth. Moreover, the opposition, if not bitter hostility of General Wadsworth to General McClellan is well known in military circles at Washington; it can be shown that Wadsworth did not wish Richmond to be taken by McClellan. But I shall not dwell upon this topic; my object in these communications is single, and I shall not be diverted from its pursuit.

Now I submit to all men whether these two points have not been established by the testimony contained in the report of the Committee on the conduct of the war.

1. If General McDowell's command had not been denied General McClellan, he would have taken Richmond a year ago.

2. There was no justifiable reason for withholding that command.

Beyond all controversy, the Committee were authorized by tha evidence, to report these conclusions, and in failing to do so, they have done General McClellan signal injustice. I arraign that committee, collectively and individually, at the bar of public opinion, and charge them with that injustice.

I shall next proceed to show that General McClellan did the best he could with the forces under his command.

YORKTOWN.

The next duty is to inquire whether, although deprived of the co-operation of McDowell's command, McClellan ought, under all the circumstances, to have taken Richmond with the force under his command. It has been asserted with great confidence that he ought; the Committee on the Conduct of the War unanimously censure, nay condemn him for not having taken the rebel capital, and captured the army which defended it. It is obvious that this condemnatory sentence cannot be met successfully by a general denial; the grounds upon which it rests must be carefully examined, step by step, first at Yorktown, then from Yorktown to Richmond, then before Richmond, &c. I shall pursue this inquiry in the light of such evidence as was furnished by the state of things existing at the times respectively when the movements of the army were made. It would be unfair to view these movements in the light of information supplied since General McClellan was ordered to leave the Peninsula, and not accessible before that time. I shall be pardoned, it being unavoidable, for giving some details of evidence which may seem dry and tedious to such of

my readers as are in a hurry and can only read short paragraphs. There are some of my countrymen, even in these times of agitation and bustle, who are willing to be at pains to investigate, and ascertain, if they can, the truth on a subject like that under consideration. To such I must be content to address myself. The first position to be examined is *Yorktown.*

It is admitted that Gen. McClellan appeared before Yorktown with an army consisting of 107,000 troops, well equipped, well drilled, well supplied, and composed of men of physical, intellectual, and moral power, such as have never been surpassed in any military organization. This army deserves the highest wrought eulogy that has ever been passed upon it. This eulogy has been recorded by the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, and history will transmit it to future generations.

Let it be remembered, for the fact seems to have been kept studiously out of mind, that the army which this loyal and ever to be honored host went to subdue were composed of American citizens, most of them native born, numerically equal, probably superior to our own, well officered, well drilled, under strict discipline, fighting behind entrenchments, on soil claimed to be their own, and animated with a zeal which the resistance of an invading enemy alone can inspire. Now although the loyal army surpassed the rebels in the material of war, this was counterbalanced by the hard lessons they had learned in the school of privation and suffering; they were at home fighting on the defensive, in positions chosen by themselves, behind ramparts of their own construction. Men versed in the art of war have learned from the records of former military conflicts, to compute with mathematical accuracy the advantages and disadvantages of armies in such circumstances, composed of the same race of men, neither superior to the other in spirit or military prowess. With such an enemy in front discharging his fire, well might McClellan implore the President, *do not force me to fight with diminished numbers.*

General McClellan in all his military operations has acted under the inspiration and guidance of two general principles.

1. The rebellion had assumed a character so formidable as to place the country in a state of civil war. Army was arrayed against army in the field. The rules for the government of belligerent parties which modern civilization furnishes, were of binding force. General McClellan had received the education of a soldier; he was well-instructed in these rules. He had before him the example of Gen. Scott, who had always conducted warfare in conformity to these rules, never for an instant departing from their injunctions, and this great General had received the approbation of his country for his course. On no consideration, to gratify no man, or set of men, would Gen. McClellan violate these rules and deviate from the path pursued by his illustrious predecessor under whom he had learned the art of war. Such a violation, such a departure, would fix a stain upon his character as a soldier, which no success could efface; besides it would dishonor the flag of the Christian nation which he served. To do this was impossible for George B. McClellan.

2. McClellan, while he meant to do what he could to put down the rebellion, to exert every nerve to accomplish this object, yet was anxious to do it without any unnecessary loss of life of the soldiers led by him; he knew who these soldiers were, whence they came, how they were connected in their respective homes and neighborhoods, and what value to set upon their lives.

These were his principles; and, besides these, as a matter of fact, he had the conviction that the enemy was a very formidable one; others could afford to despise him, but he could not. He could have wished it otherwise, but his personal knowledge of the officers who led that enemy, and the spirit and prowess of the troops led by them, forced this conviction on his

understanding; he could not ignore it, but as a soldier he felt his obligation to act upon it.

All these composed the creed of Gen. McClellan; and if the tirades of abuse amounting almost to the ravings of lunatics, which have been spoken and written against him, from Senator Chandler's speech on the floor of the Senate, down to the late editorial article in the New York Times, shall be closely analyzed and examined, it will be seen that this creed is that which mainly stirs up the ire of his opponents.

McClellan marched from Fortress Monroe towards Yorktown on the 4th of April 1862, and soon reached the fortified position which was evacuated by the enemy in great precipitation on the 4th day of May, one month thereafter. The retreat of the enemy from a very strong and well fortified position was compelled by our army in one month.

The charge against the commanding general is that he spent too much time before Yorktown—that he should have taken it immediately on his arrival before it by assault, and not waited the operations of a siege.

What is the testimony upon this point? It shall be fairly given. The Prince de Joinville, an eye witness, says:—"We reached the Confederate lines which opened on us at once, with a sharp fire of artillery. We replied, but without making any impression on the well defined works which covered the hostile cannon. The creek had been reconnoitered and found impassable by infantry, both on account of the depth of water, and of its marshy borders, in which the troops would have been under a cross-fire of numbers of sharpshooters concealed in the woods and behind the embankments.

"Throughout the seven miles of Confederate lines he encountered the same attitude of alert defence. Every where cannon and camps. Of course the inference was that we were arrested by forces apparently formidable, and before a position not easily carried."

General McClellan before the committee testifies: "Question. Could not the line of works have been assaulted when you arrived before them in full force with a fair prospect of success?—Answer. I think not. I resorted to the operations of a siege, after a more careful personal examination than a commanding general gives to such things; and I was fully satisfied that the course I adpoted was the best under the circumstances."

"Question.—You did not open your batteries as they were finished, one by one, but waited until all were ready, did you not?—Answer. We did, and expected to open fire from them all on Monday morning. A few shots were fired for a special purpose from battery No. 1 against vessels landing at the wharf."

"Question. Would it not have been better to have opened your batteries as they were completed, without waiting for the completion of all of them?—Answer. I think decidedly not; because they would probably have been overwhelmed by the concentrated fire of the enemy. The object was to wait until we had such an overwhelming force at our disposal as would crush everything before us."

General John C. Barnard, chief of General McClellan's engineer corps, who next to the general commanding, is the highest authority, reported *at the time:*—"It was not deemed practicable considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to break the line across the isthmus, and too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place" (Yorktown) "by assault."—"The forcing of such a line with so little loss, in itself is an exploit less brilliant, perhaps, but more worthy of study than would have been a murderous assault, even if it had proved successful." These are extracts from the engineer's report now made public, I believe, for the first time, but that report was accessible to the committee.

General Erastus D. Keyes commanded a division in the Army of the

Peninsula. He was before Yorktown. His advance was stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, fortified by breast works, erected, nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable; one terminus behind Yorktown, and the other ending in the James River which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. He says:—"Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side, it, and Gloucester, are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either. The approaches on our side are generally through low, swampy or thickly wooded grounds; over roads which we are obliged to repair or make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading foce in any country. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get command of either York or James River."

General Fitz John Porter who commanded the advanced corps and who also conducted the siege of Yorktown, reported: "Personal recognizances confirmed by the reports of engineer officers, and the troops, showed the Yorkstown defences to be strong, and well armed, and connected with those on the Warwick by field works for artillery and infantry; that the bridges were destroyed and the approaches to the dams which had backed up the water to overflow the banks were obstructed by abbatis and defended on the right bank by stone forts, which were well armed and manned and connected by infantry parapets."—"Officers on picket reported the enemy apparently in great numbers and very active, while deserters stated that troops at Yorktown and vicinity, originally about 15,000, had been greatly increased by arrivals from Norfolk and Richmond, and were confident of successfully defending the place."

In opposition to this is the testimony, 1st, of Gen. Silas S. Casey. He says: "That part of the army that went to Yorktown, I think, should have stormed the works, as from the information I received afterwards there were but about 7,000 or 8,000 men on the arrival of the first corps on the peninsula." This is all this witness says about storming the works. If General Casey had commanded the army, he would not have acted on information received *afterwards.*

2. General Samuel P. Heintzleman. The following testimony transcribed from the report was read by the General; "Question. If there was only about 7,000 men in Yorktown, and you had so large an army, what military objection had you to isolating the place and attacking further up the Peninsula? Answer. By the time we got to Yorktown their army had been largely reinforced there, though nothing like as fast as ours. Question. What was the estimated strength of our army there? Answer. I never heard. I was always of opinion that we could have forced their lines; and from information that I got at the Adams House, about two miles from Williamsburgh, the day before the battle there, I was satisfied we could have done so."

3. General Joseph Hooker testified: "From my examination of the works at Yorktown, and reaching away beyond the position that I occupied, I felt that their lines could be pierced without any considerable loss by the corps with which I was on duty—Heintzleman's corps. We could have gone right through, and gone to the rear of the enemy. They would run the moment we got to their rear, and we could have picked up the prisoners. Right there at Yorktown the enemy had expended a great deal of labor. But I would have marched right through the redoubts which was a part of the cordon they had, and got on the road between Yorktown and Richmond and thus compelled the enemy to fight me on my ground, and not have fought them on theirs." This

testimony is characteristic of this witness; and he would undoubtedly have marched *right through* the redoubts, always provided *the enemy had not prevented him.* He would, too, have compelled the enemy to fight him on his own ground, provided *he could have got possession of the ground, and kept it.*

So then it will be seen that the witnesses in favor of beseiging Yorktown are: 1. Prince de Joinville, 2. General McClellan, 3. Gen. Barnard, 4. Gen. Keyes, and 5. Gen. Porter. In favor of storming the works, Generals Heintzelman, Casey, and Hooker. This being a question to be decided by the opinions of military men. I take into consideration such opinions only, the opinions of what the law terms *experts;* other opinions are not competent evidence. It ought perhaps to be stated in this connection that General Barnard, although he gave the opinion above quoted from his report made at the time of the siege, yet afterwards changed his mind. The evidence of this change was furnished by a most extraordinary report made by him to General McClellan long after the siege of Yorktown; after it was well understood what testimony the committee sought in respect to General McClellan, and, strange to say, even after this general had been relieved of his command, and when it was supposed he was not in favor with the administration. It must have been painful to General Barnard to feel himself compelled to attempt the ruin of a brother officer at such a time. and under such circumstances; but let the veteran engineer console himself with the assurance I now give him, that General McClellan is not ruined in reputation; he is not dead. He may be annoyed, but he is not in disgrace, nor is he friendless,

BEFORE YORKTOWN.

I did suppose that what had been said in my last number would have been sufficient to show that General McClellan was deserving of commendation, rather than censure, for deciding to besiege the enemy's works at Yorktown in preference to carrying them by what, in the opinion of General Barnard, would have been a *murderous assault even if successful.* The country has since had some experience of such assaults at Fredericksburg. The sole consolation for our disasters in these conflicts is found in the fact that, although we lost many thousands in killed and wounded, yet perhaps the enemy suffered as severely as ourselves. But, on referring again to the report of the committee, I see that a strong point is attempted to be made against the general for what is termed his "delay before Yorktown." The following paragraph is taken from the pamphlet edition of the committee, published and sold in the office of the *New York Tribune.* The capitals and italics are also copied:

"DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN.

"All the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, variously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by General McClellan, who estimated it at from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, U. S. Senator from Virginia—then living within the rebel lines, near Williamsburg.—testifies that *the rebels did not determine to reinforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forces intended to stop before Yorktown, and intended to commence a regular siege o the place.* It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that *our forces when they first appeared before Yorktown could have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown and cutting off reinforcements, when ihe place must have fallen in a very short time.* Some of our generals expected and desired that that should be done. Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan the application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application."

I shall refute these statements in their order. It is not true that the rebels did not intend to reinforce Ma-

gruder until it was determined to commence a regular siege of Yorktown.

PROOF.

General McClellan did not contemplate the necessity of a siege when he first advanced (April 4th) upon Yorktown, after landing on the Peninsula; he then expected to be joined by McDowell's command. On the 4th of April he issued orders for the continued march of the army at an early hour the next morning. General Keyes'. General Couch's, and General Smith's divisions were ordered to positions on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, which would enable them to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown, and to intercept reinforcements coming in. But General Keyes reported the impossibility of carrying those orders into effect. specifying, among other things, that "the enemy is in great force, and is *constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is their new one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country.*" This report bore date April 7th. On the 5th and 6th of April he had previously reported that the enemy's works (Lee's Mills) in front of Smith. cannot be carried by assault. General Keyes was not before Yorktown, but in front of the enemy, on the Warwick. General McClellan himself testified: "We did not know, before we landed on the Peninsula, of the line of works along the Warwick. We knew that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, but we did not know of the line of the Warwick."

General Casey, who it will be remembered, acted under General Keyes. and did not join for several days after Keyes, says:

"From information I received afterwards," (that is after the evacuation of Yorktown), "there were but 7,000 or 8,000 men there on the arrival of the five corps" (not before Yorktown, but) "*on the Peninsula*" General Heintzelman says: "By the time *we got to Yorktown* their army (the enemy's) *had been largely reinforced.*" General McClellan, in answer to the inquiry, "What was the force of the enemy when Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula?" says: "I do not know positively; but my belief is that there was not at that time much more than Magruder's original command, which, I think, we had always estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Movements of troops had been going on across the James River to the Peninsula *some days before my arrival.* I remember *that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been crossed over to Yorktown from the south bank of the James.* I therefore hurried my own movements, and started from Fort Monro sooner than I would have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think that large masses of reinforcements arrived at Yorktown *from one to two days before I reached its vicinity.* Johston himself arrived there the day before I did."

Thus much for the proof in opposition to the testimony quoted from Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden (United States Senator!) The senator says he practiced law for a number of years, from Willimsburg down to Hampton, including Yorktown. He is asked by the committee: "In your judgment what would have been the result had a vigorous attack been made upon Yorktown proper, or a flank attack made?" The law gives value to the *judgment* of none but *experts;* it does not allow such judgments or opinions to be given in evidence, except perhaps when the witness is clothed with the dignity of "a Senator," and I freely admit that the "judgment" of Senator Bowden is of as much value as the judgment of Senator Chandler, or Senator Sherman; Senators all! But let us hear the reply of the witness. He could not forget that though a senator, he had practiced law; he therefore says: "I have very little skill, if any, in military affairs, but my decided impression is," &c. This answer was a rebuke as severe as could have been given, for putting such a question to such a man. If there had been any

honest lawyer on that committee, with even the elementary knowledge of the law of evidence, he would have said to the witness: "You are excused from giving any further answer; if you are not a military man, your opinion is no evidence, and if you are a military man, your *impression* would not be evidence." But the witness was not interrogated, and he proceeds to tell, not what he knew but what he had heard from other Union men, better qualified to judge than himself; he concludes his narration of hearsay testimony in these words: "This I gathered from others, for I did not myself go to Yorktown after the Confederates took possession of it until they evacuated it." If any one of my readers desires to know what, in particular, Senator Bowden "gathered from others," I will refer him to the report of the committee, page 583. I beg leave to take leave of the Senator, with commendation for his modesty, and I will say for him that I regard his judgment in military matters as highly as I do any other lawyer of my acquaintance.

But the committee say:—"It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that (here come the italics) *our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works, &c.*"

I have just shown what the officers *at the time* thought, but I do not find in the report that any, but General Heintzelman, were as wise *after the time* as the committee represent. This General says, I was always of the opinion that we could have forced their lines, and from information I got at the Adams House, about two miles from Willimsburg, the day before the battle there, I was satisfied we could have done so. The veteran general does not tell the committee from whence he derived this information; perhaps it was Senator Bowden, for he lived up there. If the general did get his information from this source, he certainly shows proper respect for the "civil authority," a commendable trait in a military man.

The report at the conclusion of th paragraph quoted says:

"General Heintzelman forwarde to General McClellan the applicatio of General Hamilton, commanding division, for permission to force th enemy's lines. No answer was re ceived to the application." This pas sage of the report is founded on th following testimony given by Genera Heintzelman: "We were willing t try to force the lines with a singl brigade. General Hamilton made th application, and I forwarded it to th commanding general."

On the 16th April Brigadier General Hamilton reported that the lin of rebel works for three quarters of a mile could have been carried by a single brigade, with very little loss, and "I further report that I believe I can carry these works and hold them without much loss." This is the application made by Gen. Hamilton. Gen Hamilton, when he made this report, was under the impression that the artillery in our batteries Nos. 7 and 8 had driven the enemy from Winn's Mills works, which was erroneous. No answer or direction was given to Gen. Hamilton in reply to his suggestion, because it was well known, and it had been reported by the general conducting the siege, that it had been found impracticable to cross the Warwick anywhere in the vicinity of Winn's Mills, this river not being fordable and the bridges destroyed; also that "a close and thorough reconnoissance on the 25th made by that excellent officer of the army, Col. Jesse Gove, with his regiment, the Twenty-Second Massachusetts Volunteers, confirmed his former report of the 5th and 11th, that the Warwick was not fordable, the bank swampy, and the dams near its headwaters, on account of artificial obstructions, unapproachabl in face of the enemy on the opposite banks."

Gen. Grover, part of Heintzelman's command, after carrying a small work, defending a dam east of the Warwick, near Winn's Mills, drew off his forces because the Warwick could not be crossed, the narrow dam at

that point being defended by several strong works well manned. Winn's Mills were near the headwaters of the Warwick. Gen. Barnard says in his report: "The first group of works (the enemy's) is at Winn's Mills, where there is a dam and a bridge. This bridge the enemy destroyed."

Thus I have examined and refuted sentence by sentence—the reader will see that this detail was necessary—the italicised libel of the committee which has been circulated by thousands and tens of thousands, by the aid of a metropolitan press, and the machinery of the United States government, and all for what? to destroy the reputation, as a soldier, of Geo. B. McClellan.

I have seen a copy of General Barnard's report, bearing date May 6, 1862, and of Gen. Barry's, bearing date May 5, 1862, and of General Fitz John Porter, bearing date May 8, 1862. These reports seem to me to give evidence of professional talent of a high order. The words in which *this* report of Gen. Barnard concludes have been quoted, and shall not be repeated. But the following additional quotations from the same report may be aptly given here. "If we could have broken the enemy's lines across the isthmus, we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, soon have fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country) to do so. If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by a single operation It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault." Perhaps General Hooker would not have deemed it "too hazardous;" but here let me say what I declare upon reliable authority, that this same general never saw the defences of the enemy behind the Warwick. General Barry, fully confiding in the artillery placed and pointed under his command, reported that our batteries, when opened, "would have compelled the enemy to surrender in 12 hours." But the committee did not call Barry and Porter to the witness' stand,—they selected their own witnesses; yet it must have been known to them that these generals knew a great deal about the siege of Yorktown. The enemy did not give General Barry an opportunity to try his well-placed guns, and demonstrate the power and efficiency of his batteries, but directly decided to evacuate before they were opened. What a tribute was this evacuation to the unsurpassed skill and generalship of McClellan! A force of equal, if not superior number retires, precipitately, from their own chosen and deliberately constructed fortifications, without firing a gun. Who for a moment imagined that Major General McClellan would, under similar circumstances, have retired from fortifications erected for the defence of any loyal city under his command? This young general would never have evacuated had he been behind such fortifications with an army numerically equal in his front. It cannot be denied that this siege and its result was an eminent military success. Why was not that great captain, Lieut. Gen. Winfield Scott, asked his professional opinion of the operations before Yorktown? The reply is easy—because the committee well knew he would not give an answer to suit their purpose. Yet while the siege of Yorktown, as a military enterprise, is regarded with admiration by distinguished soldiers at home and abroad; while it illustrates in a remarkable degree the proficiency of our country in the science and art of war, a committee of an American Congress make it a theme of censure, and strive by the most studied arts to defame and degrade their own illustrious countryman who suggested the plan and supervised the whole conduct of that siege. *Shame! shame!*

The joint committee must have intended to rebuke the action of the House of Representatives, which on the 9th May, 1862, passed the following resolution of thanks:—"Resolved,

That we receive with profound satisfaction intelligence of the recent victories achieved by the armies of the Potomac, associated from their localities with those of the Revolution, and that the sincere thanks of this House are hereby tendered to Major General George B. McClellan, for the display of those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of life.

I have done with Yorktown, unless the committee or some of its members see fit to reply to what is here recorded. I do not wish to be considered the defender of General McClellan. He needs no defence. The simple unvarnished narrative of what he has done, and what he has left undone, in the service of his country, and his reasons for his action and non-action, will form not only his defence but his eulogy. My office is to arraign before the American people and the world, the joint committee of Congress. It will afford me sincere gratification to be convinced that this committee does not deserve the marked reprobation of all intelligent and honorable men.

Since I sent my last number to the press I have been addressed by a merchant of high position and respectability, substantially as follows: "Well! I see you have turned military man, and are engaged in the discussion of military questions.' My reply to such a question is—I am no military man, and am no judge of military matters; that is to say, my judgment is not the result of such theoretical and practical knowledge as entitles my opinions to be received as evidence to guide the judgment of others. I am not an expert. But I do profess to some knowledge of the rules of evidence, and also to some acquaintance with the Constitution of my country, and to the duties imposed upon public officers by that Constitution.

1. As to the rules of evidence. Every witness may testify to facts which have fallen under his own observation, or which he personally knows; but information derived from others is hearsay evidence, and is open to many objections. It is very unsafe to form conclusions from such testimony.

As I have before shown, opinions can only be received as evidence when they proceed from witnesses who have, from theory and practice, peculiar knowledge of the subject upon which they testify. These rules are the result of long experience in the practical business of mankind, especially in controversies brought before courts of justice, and they have been established with the view to aiding the human mind in the endeavor to arrive at truth through the medium of human testimony. Another rule is, that leading questions shall not be put to a witness; that is to say, a question shall not be asked which suggests to the witness the answer which is desired and expected. Considering that the joint committee was composed of members, a large majority of whom were known to be unfriendly to McClellan, and were intent upon his degradation, and considering too, that most of the witnesses were dependent for their positions, and especially for their promotion, upon the favor of the Administration, leading questions would not be likely to elicit the truth. Witness the single case of General Barnard, in illustration of this remark. Now I affirm, from thorough and attentive perusal of the evidence contained in No. 1 of the committee's report, that all these rules have been grossly and repeatedly violated by the committee in taking testimony. To specify: A great deal of improper and hearsay evidence has been received in answer to questions put by the committee. Numerous opinions have been drawn forth and recorded, from witnesses whose opinions were not evidence. The report abounds with leading questions which plainly suggest to the witnesses the answers desired, and the answers are, for the most part, given desired.

2. As to the Constitution, and duties of official agents of the government:

The President, the chief of the

official organs, is by virtue of his office, commander in chief of the army, but that of itself, does not qualify him to take command of the army or to interfere in military operations. The idea, that because he is the constitutional conmander in chief of the army, he shall take command in fact, is absurd, according to the theory of our constitutional government. The country has been engaged in three wars with foreign nations since the Revolution. The short war with France, under John Adams, second President of the United States, the war with Great Britain, under Mr. Madison's Administration. and the war with Mexico, under Mr. Polk's Administration. Neither of these Presidents ever for a moment undertook to interfere directly with troops or regiments in the field. The idea of John Adams, or James Madison, eminent statesmen as they were, bestriding a horse and reviewing an army, would strike any American citizen of their day as ridiculous. A President may put in office, by consent of the Senate. the incumbents of the War Department; but when duly filled with officers, constitutionally chosen, this department must manage and control military operations in time of war. The like is true of every other department. Who expects the President to control the operations of the Treasury Department? Would Mr. Chase allow for a moment such interference or control? Certainly not. President Lincoln has practically violated this established theory of our government. He has interfered directly, in his own proper person, with military operations; he has personally directed generals in command what they ought to do, and what they ought to leave undone. What has been the result? Nothing but evil and disaster. I have shown, beyond the possibility of refutation, that but for the interference of the President, General McClellan would have taken Richmond a year ago Unless this war is conducted by military men, upon military principles, it needs no prophet to tell us it can never succeed. It is a well known fact that the General-in-Chief at Washington does not control the military operations of the country, but he is constantly interfered with and controlled by the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, and this constitutional commander is constantly under an outside pressure, not directed by military science, which he has more than once acknowledged his utter inability to resist. Is it possible that our cause should prosper when these things exist? My remedy is:—Let George B. McClellan be made General-in-Chief and Acting Secretary of War, and then let him control the operations of the war, without interference, just as Mr. Chase now controls the operations of the Treasury Department without interference. Then success will follow, and confidence will be felt that military operations will be properly conducted.

This number is an episode suggested by the question casually put to me as above stated. I shall accompany the Army of the Potomac from Yorktown to Williamsburg in my next number.

FROM YORKTOWN TO WILLIAMSBURG.

Yorktown was evacuated on the 4th of May, 1862; suddenly, unexpectely, precipitately evacuated. What, then, was the duty of General Mc Clellan, and did he perform that duty? It is obvious that fresh, hot, and vigorous pursuit was one branch of that duty. By this means the enemy, or a part of his force, might be encountered and captured. Another and more important branch of his duty was, if posaible, to intercept the retreat of the enemy by throwing a force between him and Richmond. Let us see what the general actually did; his own testimony on this point is too clear and comprehensive to require elucidation or abridgment. Here it is: "As soon as I knew that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. I ordered the cavalry under General Stoneman, with the horse-artillery in pursuit. I directed the divisions of Kearney and Hooker to move by the direct road from Yorktown to Wil-

liamsburg, while the divisions of Smith, Couch, and Casey, were ordered by the road from Warwick Court House to Williamsburgh. Franklin's division, which was on the Transports, was ordered up to Yorktown, with the intention of moving it to the vicinity of West Point, in order to intercept the retreat of the enemy. The divisions of Richardson, Sedgwick, and Porter were moved to the immediate vicinity of Yorktown, ready either to support the troops who had advanced by land, or to go by water, as circumstances might render advisable. The general instructions given to the troops ordered in pursuit were to overtake the enemy and inflict as much damage as possible. This was on Sunday. That night I heard that the cavalry had come up with the enemy in the vicinity of Williamsburg, and that the infantry were within a half hour's march, rapidly approaching, and would undoubtedly carry the position. Gen. Sumner was in command of the troops ordered to the front. I remained at Yorktown on Sunday, and on Monday morning engaged in arranging for the forwarding of Franklin's division to West Point, and in consultation with the naval commander, as well as other duties incident to my position.

I heard nothing from the front on Monday morning that gave me any idea that there was anything serious involved. I heard nothing from General Sumner. The first intimation I had that there was anything at all serious was from Governor Sprague, who came to me at Yorktown and told me that things were not going on well in front. This was, I think, about noon; it may have been half an hour or an hour one way or the other. He told me that things were not going well, and that my presence in front was necessary. As soon as I heard that I took a boat, went down to camp where my horses were, and immediately left for the front, meeting on the way the Prince de Joinville, and an aid of General Sumner, who had been sent back to hurry me up. Up to this time I had had no information from General Sumner or any one in command, that there was anything at all serious in front. I arrived on the ground, I should think, about an hour or an hour and a half before dark. I acquainted myself, as rapidly as possible, with the state of affairs, and immediately ordered reinforcements to General Hancock, who was heavily engaged when I arrived, and I endeavored to communicate with General Heintzelman, who was on the left of our position. I was told that it was impossible to communicate directly with our left under General Heintzelman. I sent an officer, Capt. Alexander, with a company to endeavor to open communication with General Heintzelman, that I might learn the state of affairs there. He returned after dark with the information that it was impracticable to get through the marsh. I tnen went round some seven or eight miles, by way of the rear, to communicate.

During the night I heard from General Heintzelman that Hooker's division had been badly cut up, and could not be relied upon for very heavy work in the morning; that Kearney's division, although it had suffered severely, could be fully relied upon to hold its own; and that no advance could be made in that quarter without having reinforcements.

I felt satisfied, from what I knew of Hancock's position, that the battle was won; that he had occupied the decisive point, and gained possession of a portion of the enemy's line; and that they must make a night retreat or we would have greatly the advantage of them in the morning. So fully was I satisfied of that, that I countermanded orders that I had given in the afternoon, for the advance of Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions to the front and sent them back to Yorktown to go by water; feeling sure that the battle was won." Here is the whole story, uncontradicted by any reliable testimony. The committee make no open and direct attack upon General McClellan for failure of duty in pursuing the enemy to Williamsburg, but they make insinuations by which they

mean to leave an impression that he was remiss in duty. The most salient of these indirect attacks are italicised by the *Tribune* in his edition of the report. The passages thus made prominent are these: "*Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending of two divisions up the York River to West Point.*" * * "He" (Gov. Sprague) "testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked tnat he had supposed 'those in front could attend to that little matter.'" The report of the committee adds: "After some time General McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon."

The charges are, then: 1. *General McClellan remained behind*, &c. The committee mean to imply that he ought to have been in front, facing the danger. 2, Upon being informed of the collision at Williamsburg, he made light of it; and 3. He was slow, when informed there was trouble in front, in giving relief.

1. General McClellan, instead of going himself in pursuit of the retreating enemy, sent several of his corps commanders, men of high military reputation, aud of experience, while he remained at Yorktown to dispatch a body of troops by water to intercept the retreat of the enemy, by getting between him and Richmond. Before the evacuation of Yorktown it was impracticable for our naval force to go up York River. At a narrow pass in this river, between Yorktown and Gloucester Point, there were very formidable fortifications and armaments on both sides—on the side of Yorktown and on the side of Gloucester Point; these were under the control of the enemy before the evacuation. If either of these positions was in our hands the obstacle in the way of our naval operations up York River would have been removed. The original purpose was that McDowell's force should take Gloucester Point, when Yorktown could not have failed to be evacuated, and a free passage to Richmond made for our army not only by land, up the Peninsula, but also up the York River. The execution of this purpose having been defeated, as we have seen, the next thing to be done was to gain the works on the Yorktown side, and the same result would have been brought about. After the evacuation York River was unobstructed, and now it became a very desirable object to embark a force at Yorktown, send it up York River to West Point, and thus intercept the retreat of the enemy to Richmond. For this purpose it became necessary to make suitable arrangements with the naval commander, and get the troops on board and under way. McClellan judged that the best interests of the service required him to remain, and personally supervise the accomplishment of this work, for there were difficulties in the way which required to be removed. Who can queston the soundness of this decision? Yet this prevented the general from being at or near Williamsburg when an actual collision occurred. When he was sent for, and apprised of the danger, he went promptly. But because a collision did occur—and it would not have occurred if Gen. Stoneman had been more tardy in pursuit—and because there was danger which General McClellan was not present to share, the committee most unfairly, most unmanfully, think a proper opportunity is afforded, which they are prompt to improve, to insinuate that the general shrinks at the prospect of danger, and is deficient in personal courage. I say an "insinuation" is made; it would have been imprudent, probably unsafe, for the committee to make a direct charge of cowardice; they therefore find it convenient to deal in insinuations; "unsafe," not that Gen. McClellan would have noticed it, but there are probably many brave men in the army less discreet, exercising less self-control than the general, who might have resented it by chastising the authors of such a charge. Similar insinuations are made in other parts of the committee's report, intended to wound the sensibilities of a soldier, which shall be noticed hereafter.

The committee seem to think that the commander-in-chief of 100,00 men can best prove his fitness for his high position by rushing into danger. and exposing his own life; the Joint Committee of Congress need instruction on this point, and any corporal in the army could give them that instruction.

2 The general " made light of it." That expression is incorporated in the report, being extracted from the testimony of Governor Sprague, who testifies: " With one orderly I left the advance at 12 o'clock to go to Yorktown and communicate the condition of affairs to General McClellan, who was supposed to be at Yorktown. though no communication had been received from him since early the day before. I reached Yorktown in about one hour and a half, and found General McClellan with General Fitz John Porter and General Franklin. I communicated to him the condition of affairs at the front, and urged him to go up there at once. His reply was that he thought they could take care of *this little matter*, but he said he would immediately leave for the front." " I afterwards ascertained that General McClellan arrived at the front about five o'clock."

This testimony of Governor Sprague was thought worthy of being incorporated in the report. and of being made prominent in the *Tribune's* edition, and yet the committee could hardly have relied on the accuracy of the witness Sprague, for according to his testimony the general must have been with the army in five hours after he, Sprague, left Williamsburg, a distance of twelve miles, and traveled over a road almost impassable. Yet the committee say, " after some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown, &c." Yet it did so happen that after the general had arrived at Williamsburg, reinforcements were sent in the proper direction, order and confidence were restored. He saw at once that the enemy had been whipped, and immediately ordered several generals to return at once to Yorktown and embark with Franklin. This will do for Williamsburg.

FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO CHICKAHOMINY.

It has been shown in these papers hat General McClellan would have aken Richmond a year ago, if he had been permitted to execute the purposes he had formed with the concurrence of the Administration. This is not denied by the opponents of Gen. McClellan; but they say, *first*, that there were good grounds for the withholding of McDowell's command, and, *secondly*, that, without the aid of this command, there were several opportunities for taking Richmond, which the general failed to improve. Among other opportunities neglected was that which occurred immediately after the battle at Williamsburg, when, it is said, our army could have entered Richmond.

The first of these grounds has been replied to. I now come to the second, which shall be examined in the light of the testimony and contemporaneous history, with as much candor, fairness and impartiality as I can exercise.

After describing the battle of Williamsburg, in which he bore a conspicuous part, General Hooker is asked by the committee this question: " Is it your judgment that you could have gone into Richmond then?" To which he answers: " I think we could have moved right on, and got into Richmond by the second day after that battle without another gun being fired." General Keys is asked: " Do you know why there was not an immediate and general pursuit of the enemy after the battle?" He replied: " I do not." Again: " In your judgment, as a military man, should or should not there have been an immediate pursuit?" Answer—" My opinion, as a military man, is that the most vigorous and immediate pursuit should have been made after the battle of Williamsburgh." Question—" In your judgment, if an immediate and vigorous pursuit had been made, what would have been the result?" Answer—" If an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the enemy had been made, I think we should have over-

taken portions of his troops, and have been able to capture such baggage as he took with him. I think also it would have hastened our arrival in the neighborhood of Richmond, and we should have been able to attack the enemy before he had made the preparations for defence and obtained the reinforcements which our delay gave him an opportunity of doing."

General McClellan testifies that it is about fifty miles from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, that is to New Bridge. He is then asked: "It has been stated that some two weeks were occupied in the movement from Williamsburgh to the Chickahoiminy; will you explain the reason for that?" Answer—"I do not remember the exact time; I can only say that we were very much delayed after the affair at Williamsburg by the condition of the roads, and the diffiulty in bringing up supplies. We had a great deal of trouble of that kind before reaching the Chickahominy. I think the movemeht was made as rapidly as possible under the circumstances." Question—"After leaving Williamsburg you met with no serious resistance from the enemy until after crossing of Bottom's Bridge, did you?" Answer—"Merely cavalry affairs. There were some sharp cavalry affairs, but no resistance in large force."

The committee say in their report: "Several of the generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could be followed into Richmond—one of them says without firing a gun. Gen. McClellan says that the roads were so bad in consequence of the rains, that it was impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit."

All the testimony bearing upon the point under review, and the reference of the committee to the same, is here transcribed. General McClellan is at issue with Generals Hooker and Keyes, and the committee evidently favor the testimony against McClellan. I hope my readers will patiently follow me while I investigate the question—is the bias of the committee in the right direction.

It is true that the roads were bad in consequence of the rains, and that made it impracticable to pursue the enemy vigorously. On the night when the rebels evacuated Williamsburg, Prince de Joinville says "that the rain was falling in torrents," and, before that time, and ever since the leaving of Yorktown, there had been copious rains. On the night before the battle at Williamsburg, General Hooker says "that the roads had become so very muddy—raining very hard—the mud was knee-deep, and my men had become so fatigued that I halted right in the road, intending to renew the march at the dawn of day in the morning." But the condition of the roads was not the only cause why General McClellan could not proceed on the morning after the battle. He says he was prevented "by the condition of the roads, *and the difficulty in bringing up supplies.*" It will be remembered that the base of supplies for our army was Yorktown, and the base of supplies for the rebel army was Richmond.

We were marching from our base of supplies, and the enemy was marching to his base of supplies. Our army left Yorktown in great haste to pursue the retreating enemy; it took as small an amount of provisions and ammunition as conld be conveniently transported in a rapid march—the roads being in a wretched condition for travel. General Casey testifies: "On the morning of the 4th of May, when there was some evidence that the enemy was about evacuating their lines, I was ordered at a half hour's notice to go to the river and leave everything behind—tents, blankets, knapsacks and everything. When I got there the enemy had evacuated their works. I then intended to send back for the tents, blankets and knapsacks for my men. But I got a peremptory order from General Sumner to push on after the enemy, without waiting for anything. The consequence was that my division—a great many of them—were without blankets and knapsacks for severl weeks. It was raining terribly all the time,

and the consequence was that I lost a great many men from that exposure, as they were obliged to lie down in the mud, exposed to the rain, without any protection whatever." Gov. Sprague says: "We had started off to Yorktown so hurriedly that no preparations for rations had been made, aud many of the regiments had nothing to eat." Gen. Heintzelman says: "Most of the troops were out of ammunition." Heintzelman, as I am informed, reported on the 5th of May that all his provisions would be exhausted that night, and that Hookers's and Kearney,s commands were so much exhausted and injured by the contest as not to be reliable for service the next morning. Kearney's ammunition and provisions were mainly exhausted. These being the facts, who can fail to see that it was utterly impracticable to pursue the enemy immediately after the battle of Williamsburg. On the 4th of May about 45,000 troops started from Yorktown by land in great haste to pursue a retreating enemy, carrying with them such ammunition and supplies only as could be carried on a rapid march. Generals Franklin, Sedgwick and Porter went up the York River with their commands to West Point, at which place Franklin with his 11,000 troops arrived on the evening of the 6th and the morning of the 7th of May. After the retreat from Williamsburg, Johnson, the rebel comcommander, marched rapidly to West Point to prevent the landing of Franklin's command before Sedgwick and Porter should arrive with their commands. It must be obvious that in this condition of things Gen. McClellan could not march upon Richmond until he had established a base of supplies nearer to Richmond than Yorktown, and brought up his commissary stores asd ammunition for the supply of his army to such base of operations. These supplies had to be brought up the York River, and landed at Elton, on the side of the Pamunkey River opposite West Point. Elton was the first temporary depot for these supplies, and the next temporary depot was Cumberland, situated on the Pumunkey about fifteen miles from West Point, while the main base of supplies was finally fixed at White House on the Pamunkey River, where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pumnnkey, and about thirty miles from Richmond. To make these necessary arrangements required all the time that was taken to prepare the Army of the Potomac to proceed on its march to the Chickahominy.

The testimony, therefore, of Generals Hooker and Keyes is very loose and unreliable. The Prince de Joinville, who has given to Europe and the world the most clear, accurate and soldierlike history of the campaign on the Peninsula that has yet appeared, after describing the capture of Williamsburg, proceeds:—"The mass of Federal troops was detained by the necessity of waiting for provisions from Yorktown, the arrival of which was retarded by the state of the roads. They came at last, and as the fine weather dried the roads up very fast, a two days' march brought us up with the corps which had disembarked and established a depot at the head of York River. The whole army was collected around this point, and then resumed its march to Richmond, along the Pumunkey, a navigable affluent of the York.

How evident therefore it is that the testimony of Hooker is utterly incredible, when he says, "I think we could have moved right on and got into Richmond the second day after the battle without another gun being fired." Fifty miles' march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy in two days, the roads being in the worst condition imaginable for travel, the army being without food, short of ammunition, and a portion of it exhausted after severe fighting—who can believe such a witness? But this is the opinion of General Hooker—the professional opinion—and all distinguished men of his profession acquainted with the character of General McClellan will put as much confidence in this opinion as in that other

opinion which he has uttered under oath: "I do not hesitate to say that the failure of the Peninsula campaign is to be attributed to the want of generalship on the part of our commander." While that record remains, General Joseph Hooker will never have the confidence of the Army of the Potomac, for that army will never believe that he can be a safe and reliable leader "who bears false witness against his neighbor." This general, whom the Prince de Joinville styled "an admirable soldier," has, since he gave his testimony against General McClellan, been placed at the head of a larger army than that commanded by McClellan on the Peninsula—an army well clad, well supplied, and well appointed in every respect, and he has had the opportunity of meeting the enemy; how he improved that opportunity the country knows, the world knows, and especially do the officers and soldiers who fought under him know; they are capable of instituting a comparison between him and the general whom he has defamed, and I greatly err if that general will shrink from the comparison.

Gen. McClellan is not the only military chief who has been assailed in the testimony of Hooker, who says "that Gen. Sumner was in command (at Williamsburg) with a large force, certainly not less than 30,000 men. He could have advanced through the line of defences across the Peninsula at Williamsburg without losing ten men. The enemy could not fire for I had him in a vice. I wanted him to advance, and until three o'clock of that day I expected he would advance and march through the line held by the enemy, and go to picking up prisoners. During this time my own troops were engaged with not less than three or four times my number. Gen. Kearney, who was the last of all the army to leave Yorktown—except Porter's division, which was left to garrison Yorktown—was the first to come to my assistance. If General Sumner had advanced, the rebellion would have been buried there. He did not advance at all! Here, then, it would seem that that veteran General Sumner lost a glorious opportunity to finish the rebellion." But it happens that the old general was there before the committee also to testify. He says that none of his own corps were there. It was ten miles in the rear. He was in command there by virtue of his seniority in rank. He occupied the centre. Question by Mr. Odell—"What was the number of troops under your command at the centre?" Answer—"My impression now is that before General Peck arrived there was not to exceed a brigade and a half of infantry at that point, or about two-thirds of Smith's division. There was a large body of cavalry there, but I did not look upon them as available troops to hold that point against an attack from the woods." Question.—"About how many men were there in that brigade and a half?" Answer.—"I do not think there could have been to exceed 3,000 men; all the rest of the forces under my control were in the rear, coming up." It will be seen that the uumber of troops under Gen. Sumner's command differs from the statement of Gen. Hooker as three to thirty. General Sumner further testifies: "An application was made to me for reinforcements for Gen. Hooker; I think I complied with the application by sending my staff officers to the rear to hurry up the troops from the rear. I did not deem it safe to send any more troops from the centre, and the result showed that it was fortunate I had not done so. I allude to the attack made by the enemy in the afternoon at the centre." Thus much for Gen. Hooker, the present commander of the army of the Potomac.

But what shall be said of Gen. Keyes? He has a reputation in the army differing widely from that of Gen. Hooker; he is regarded as a reliable man—how could this general give the professional opinion that "the most vigorous and immediate pursuit should have been made after the battle of Williamsburg?" How could that distinguished general have answered the following ques-

tions if they had been put: Was it practicable for the army to have moved when their provisions were exhausted? When they were short of ammunition, to have moved at all before a base of supplies was established? From the facts above stated, all of which are of the most reliable character, it will be seen how Gen. Keyes must have answered these interrogatories if they had been put to him. It is melancholy to think that men who never lack courage on the field of battle should fail to speak their honest convictions when they have reason to suppose that the utterance of undisguised truth will give offence to those in power. We have seen a melancholy exemplification of this truth in the case of General Barnard, and we fear a similar illustration is exhibited in the case of General Keyes; he knew what kind of testimony the committee wanted. General Keyes gave this testimony, it will be recollected, when Gen. McClellan was no longer at the head of an army, but supposed to be in disgrace. He was examined on the 26th March, 1863. We think there is some foundation for the fear above expressed—not as to the physical courage of General Keyes, for he is no coward, but as to the higher quality of moral courage, in the following statement: On the 16th of April, 1862, General Keyes sent a report, from which we have before quoted, to the Assistant Adjutant General of the Army of the Potomac. We take the following extract from this report: "I was thus enabled in the first day to comprehend with tolerable clearness the position of the enemy from a short distance above Lee's Mills down to James River. He is in a strongly fortified position behind Warwick River, the fords in which have been destroyed by dams, and the approaches to which are through dense forests, swamps and marshes. *No part of his line, as far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life.*" Other quotations have been given from General Keyes in former numbers.

This was the opinion of General Keyes, officially expressed, when he was with the army before the lines at Yorktown; but before the committee, after General McClellan was relieved of his command, he says, among other things, "My impression now is, that if the whole army had been pressed forward we could have found a point to break through But I give this simply as my impression." After stating that Yorktown was very strongly defended, and if we made an assault on it we should have met with severe loss, he says: "I will not say if we had pressed on immediately on arriving in front of their lines, we might not have found a point where we could have broken the line, and then have invested Yorktown on two sides, when the fall of it, of course, would have been hastened. It is my opinion that if we had pressed on rapidly when we first arrived, we might have found a point through which we could have broken."

Thus it will be seen that the generamakes a distinction between Yorkl town proper and the lines of the enemy on the Warwick, extending to James River. He was not before Yorktown with his command, but on the lines, and it is as to the practicability *of assaulting the lines* that he speaks in the report above referred to.

BEFORE RICHMOND.

These numbers are resumed after an interim of intense public anxiety, and, I may add, of great joy, in which the popular mind and feeling have been too much engrossed to give any attention to historical events. The Army of the Potomac, after sad experience at Fredericksburg, and a signal and most important victory at Gettysburg, is now where it was after the not less important victory at Antietam, when General McClellan was relieved of his command. Had the Administration not seen fit to remove General McClellan, the officers of the Army of the Potomac, with almost entire unanimity, always excepting Major General Joseph Hooker, would, it is believed, bear testimony that in their judgment our army would not have been defeated in Virginia on the

two occasions referred to, and, certainly, the rebel army of General Lee would not have ventured a second invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. That invasion has, however, been made, attended with immense destruction and loss of property, the most frightful alarm of peaceable citizens, and very serious loss of life. Shall there be no day of reckoning for these things? We shall see when the ballot boxes receive the votes of the American people. Until then let us be patient, and be especially careful that no previous irregularities change the character of the issue then to be decided.

When the enemy retreated from Williamsburg he returned to his capital and his base of supplies. Our army had not established a base of supplies between Yorktown and Richmond. It requires not a military man to say that a large army cannot carry on its proper operations, nay, tnat it cannot exist, without being in near and easy communication with its depot of daily food, ammunition, and other indispensable supplies. The capital of the enemy was fortified; before General McClellan pursued the enemy to his capital with a view to assault it, he must of course establish a base of supplies for his own army, and store it with the necessary articles of consumption. That base of supplies was established at the White House, on the Pamunkey River, a stream rising in a region of country north of Richmond, and discharging its waters in the Charles River at West Point. The Pamunkey River is navigable from the Charles to the White House, so that this base of supplies was accessible by water. The White House, too, was in direct communication with Richmond by a railroad running from West Point to that capital. So soon as this base of supplies was fixed and stored, General McClellan moved his army on Richmond. General McClellan was asked before the committee—Question. It has been stated that some two weeks were occupied in the movement from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy; will you explain the reason for that? Answer. I do not remember the exact time; I can only say we were very much delayed after the affair at Williamsburg by the condition of the roads and the difficulty in bringing up supplies. We had a great deal of trouble of that kind before reaching the Chickahominy. I think the movement was made as rapidly as possible under the circumstances.

This answer cannot fail to satisfy all reasonable persons. The enemy retreated to Richmond; he could have entered his fortified capital had he chose to do so, and certainly General McClellan could not divine whether he would enter or not. It was a reasonable supposition that he would. What defense the enemy could have made behind his fortifications at Richmond is not known to this day; we never assaulted those fortifications, and have no certain knowledge of their construction or their strength, But this we know—the city of Richmond is capable, from its position and surroundings, of being fortified so as to repel the assault of an invading army. For one whole year before, the enemy was apprised of our intention to capture Richmond, and during all that time he was laying out and constructing fortifications to resist an assault. He had officers skilled in the art of engineering and the art of defence. These facts are certainly known. What we should have found Richmond if we had attempted an assault can only be conjectured; but the probability is that we should have been required to operate by siege, as was done at Yorktown and at Vicksburg, and in both instances successfully, one without loss, and the other at a great sacrifice of life. We say it is probable we should have besieged it, because it is certain the rebel force behind the fortifications exceeded in number our troops in front of them. This fact is capable of proof, and I call upon the opponents of General McClellan to consider it, to ponder it, and then confess their error in assailing his conduct and his character.

General Barnard testified before the

committee as follows: "No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men, and 3,000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals." What reply can you make to these facts, gentlemen? Can you join the President of the United States and others in censuring General McClellan for calling for reinforcements?

Had the Chickahominy and the margins of that river been in their usual condition, our army could have crossed that stream and followed the enemy as near to Richmond as it would have been safe to approach his fortifications. But the Chickahominy was not in its usual condition, nor was it in the condition it was when Gen. McClellan began to change his base of operations. Thus, this stream is described with professional accuracy in the testimony of General Barnard: "A word is proper here respecting the Chickahominy, which, at the season we struck it, was one of the most formidable obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of our army—an obstacle to which an ordinary *river*, though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight. The Chickahominy, considered as a military obstacle, consists of a stream of no great value, a swamp, and bottom lands. The stream flows through a belt of heavily timbered swamp, which averages three or four hundred yards wide. A few hundred yards below New Bridge is a short length of the stream not margined by swamp timber; but everywhere else between New and Bottom's Bridges the belt of swamp timber is continuous and wide. The tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of the high lands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening from view the bottom lands and slopes of the high lands on the enemy's side. The disappearance, in the place indicated of swamp timber near New Bridge, and the dwindling away of the same at some points above the bridge to isolated trees, gave us some glimpse of the enemy's side near this point. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided into several; and when but a foot or two above its summer level, overspreads the whole swamp." * * * "It was currently reported at the time of our arrival that the stream was nowhere fordable." * * * "Although it was thus shown that the stream was no obstacle for infantry, the swamp and the bottom lands were *impracticable to cavalry and artillery.* It was necessary to provide bridges, and, except at the site of the New Bridge, to corduroy a certain length of road on each margin."

Now at this distance of time, when space has been given for cool reflection, it is hoped that General McClellan will be pardoned by his enemies for tbe condition in which he found the Chickahominy, and the swamps and submerged lands consequent upon that condition. It has been reproachfully charged by a member of the War Committee, on the floor of the Senate, long before the report of that committee was made, that we went to digging. "We found the worst swamp there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in the centre of it and went to digging." Who was it that made the swamp? How came it in the way of our army? Could a major general, in full command, have prevented it by a general order? "Who hath divided a water course for the overflowing of water, or a way for the lightning or the thunder? Hath the rain a father, or who hath begotten the drops of dew?" There was indeed a "swamp" and more than a swamp, as we have seen, a complete submersion of a most formidable character. This overflow was so sudden and unexpected that some persons conjectured that sluices had been cut above Richmond, and water let in from other sources to increase the volume of the stream. The rebels said it was an interposition of Divine Providence to save their capital. Certain it is that General McClellan had no power to prevent this overflow. Nor ought the general to be censured with

extreme severity by his radical fellow-citizens, because there went up from these surcharged swamps a miasm which poisoned the atmosphere and caused sickness in the camps. The general could not help it; all he could do was to remain at his post, faithful in the discharge of duty, and inhale the same poisoned atmosphere inhaled by those under his command. He was not censured by the privates in the ranks of his army, nor by the officers either, until some of them were called to swear before the War Committee. The army of the Potomac at that time was composed of men capable of judging of the qualifications and the merits of their commanders. That army did not censure their chief commander, but they loved him. The most affecting anecdote I ever heard was related to me by a member of the N. Y. 7th regiment. This regiment was stationed for three months in the summer of 1862 in Baltimore. It was a part of their duty to assist the wounded soldiers coming daily from the Army of the Potomac to land, and aid them to the hospitals, or in the further prosecution of their journey. These wounded and sick soldiers expressed an ardent attachment for General McClellan. One young man, very feeble, was assisted to land by the person who related to me the anecdote; he summoned up his remaining strength, raised his head, rested on his elbow, cheered for General McClellan, and died.

General Howard, an educated and accomplished soldier, a graduate of West Point, and afterwards a professor in that celebrated institution, made a speech to his fellow-citizens in Portland, Maine, from which the following is an extract:

"My friends, much has been said in regard to the general intrusted with the command there—much adulation and much abuse. I believe in my heart that General McClellan is worthy to be trusted. You can trust him, but you must submerge political parties, however, in the good of the country. You sent me forth to one of your institutions, without any special politics except love of country. This war is educating us up to that standard of patriotism. When we shall have shed a little more blood, we shall learn to live more in accordance with the spirit of our fathers. I know that I am no worshipper of men. I do not believe that General McClellan has passed through the campaign thus far without a mistake, but for one I trust him and urge you to. Trust him, not as a god, but as a general. He has shown at every movement great ability and caution; too much so, perhaps, for some who are inclined to doubt him; but whether so or not is to be tested by results. I hope we don't need the instruction of another Bull Run to teach us to be cautious. It is best to be. The old men say so, and when you find a young man combining ability with caution, you may trust him, for you have there the sprightliness of youth combined with the considerotian and reflection of age."

The general, at the time of making that speech, had lost an arm in one of the battles before Richmond. He has since done distinguished service in the field at Chancellorsville and at Gettysburg. He adds to his high military qualifications the character of a sincere and enlightened Christian. *He was not called to testify before the War Committee.*

[The previous matter was contained in eleven numbers, which through inadvertance, have been run together. Hereafter we shall give the numbers as in the original publications.]

NO. XII.

We have seen what was the condition of the Chickahominy on the arrival of our army at the stream, and the formidable obstacles thereby interposed to our military operations. General McClellan cannot, of course, be responsible for this condition of things; he could not use his artillery or his cavalry, as we have seen by the testimony of General Barnard. It was impossible in that condition of the ground to make any aggressive demonstrations upon Richmond; before those were attempted, as he was compelled to wait until the waters

which had swelled the streams and saturated the bottom land on its borders, should subside, and the ground become dry and hard. In the mean time all he could do was to prepare to repel assaults on his own level before Richmond by the rebel forces operating on their own grounds. But it was certain that General McClellan needed reinforcements, and he had not yet despaired of being joined by McDowell's forces collected at Fredericksburg. "They covered nothing at this place," says the Prince de Joinville, and were so notoriously useless to the Federal cause, that in the Confederate journals they were spoken of as the "fifth wheel of the coach." The Prince proceeds: "It was known that McDowell desired ardently to give the lie to these raileries by bringing at the decisive moment, his assistance to the cause of the Union. Accordingly, McClellan had no sooner arrived before Richmond than he undertook to discover what he had to hope for from this quarter. No official advices either from Washington or from Fredericksburg had informed him of McDowell's presence at that point, but rumor and probability agreed so well in placing him there that the General-in-Chief resolved to make an attempt to establish a communication with him. On the night of the 26th (May 1862) "he sent forward General Porter's division, with a few squadrons of cavalry, in a furious storm to Hanover Court House, a village about twenty miles north of Richmond, where the railway to Fredericksburg crosses the Pamunkey. The troops of Porter moved rapidly, and about mid-day on the 27th came upon the hostile division of Branch at Hanover Court House. This they assailed with vigor, dispersed it, and took one of its guns. Assailed in their turn by Confederate troops who had suffered them to pass by the woods where they lay hidden, turned on their new enemies and scattered them also. This brilliant affair cost the Federals 400 men, and left General Porter in possession of a cannon. of 500 prisoners, and of two bridges, one on the Fredericksburg and one on the Virginia Central Railroad. The advance guard of Mc Dowell was then at Bowling Green, fifteen miles from that of Porter. It needed only an effort of will; the two armies were united, and the fall of Richmond certain! Alas! this effort was not made. I cannot recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of the heart. Seated in an orchard in the bivouac of Porter, amid the joyous excitement which followed a successful combat, I saw the Fifth Cavalry bring in whole companies of Confederate prisoners, with arms and baggage, their officers at their head.' May I be pardoned so far to digress as to say, which it has no doubt, greatly pained the foreign prince to hear, that his friend Porter, has been stripped of his bivouac, and turned out upon the world, with every mark of disgrace that his government could stamp upon him; but the prince and the world may rest assured that these marks shall be effaced from a character as radiant of military honors as any in his native land, by a grateful country, and the patriotic soldier shall yet be restored to the rank of which he has been unjustly deprived. This opinion and prediction I venture after a careful study of the official record of General Porter's trial.

This battle at Hanover Court House has been adverted to in those numbers, but cannot properly be omitted here in describing the progress of the campaign in chronological order, although liable to the charge of repetition. I shall notice the battles before Richmond in future numbers.

NO. XIII.

FAIR OAKS.

There can be no just judgment formed of the measures adopted and executed by General McClellan in the conduct of his campaigns, except by considering them first in their general plan, and then examining them in detail. The general outline of his operations, as dictated by himself alone, or as agreed upon in council with others, shall be fairly and fully stated; for the present, let every day's work

be csrutinized, and the questions put be fairly answered,—What could the general have done to-day which he did not do? What has he left undone to-day which he might have done?

In answering these questions it is not only right but indispensable that the unforeseen and natural obstacles interposed in the way of his operations should be duly regarded. For instance, who could have foreseen, what human power could have prevented the copious and unexpected showers of rain which poured down and swelled the Chickahominy, and submerged the margins of this stream—a wide area of bottom land—rendering the ground unfit for military movements? In addition to this natural occurrence, the general was met by a military array of the most formidable character. These were the forces to be conquered, and the eye of the fair critic must be kept constantly upon them, as well as upon the force subject to our own command.

It has been shown that the junction of McDowell had been prevented "at the moment," says the Prince de Joinville, "when the junction would have been decisive of the campaign." "Henceforth," adds the Prince, "the army of the Potomac could only rely upon itself. No time was to be lost before acting, for every day augmented the disproportion between the forces of the adversaries, and it was to be feared the Federals encamped amid the marshes of the Chickahominy would suffer severely from the great heats now setting in. We had been for some days face to face. The Federal advance was but five miles distant from Richmond. Skirmishes were of daily occurrence, and with the feelings on both sides, a general action was inevitable. Gen. McClellan waited for two things before making the attack. He waited for the roads, which the rain had swamped, to become solid and practicable for his artillery, and for the completion of the numerous bridges which he was throwing over the Chickahominy." The character of the localities, the impossibility of quitting the railway by which the army was supplied, and the necessity of keeping on his guard against any attempt of the enemy to turn his position, had forced the general to divide his troops into two wings, on the opposite banks of the river. It was consequently most important to be able to mass them rapidly, either on the right bank for an offensive movement against Richmond, or on the left bank against any attempt to turn the position. Here it will be seen that the side of the stream towards Richmond is called the *right bank*, while the opposite side is called the *left bank*. "The danger of turning the position was much to be feared, for the Confederates had retained possession of several bridges on the upper Chickahominy, which would permit them to occupy the excellent positions that are to be found on the left bank, just so soon as the Northern army should abandon these positions. To make this more plain, the Confederates could cross the stream in its upper part, and come down and get between our forces on the right, and our base of supplies, the White House, if we failed to guard the left bank with a sufficient force to intercept such a movement. In this way they would have shut us up upon the right bank blockaded, starved, and reduced to an extremely critical position. "The roads," says the same intelligent and impartial witness, "were long in drying, the bridges were long in building." "Never have we seen so rainy a season,' said the oldest inhabitant. "Never did we see bridges so difficult to build," said the engineers. The abominable river laughed at all their efforts; too narrow for a bridge of boats, too deep and too muddy for piers; here, a simple brook some ten yards wide flowing between two pieces of quicksand, in which the horses stuck up to their girths, and which offered no bearing; there, divided into a thousand tiny rivulets spread over a surface of three hundred yards, and traversing one of those woody morasses which are peculiar to tropical countries, changing its level and its bed from day to day, the river in its

capricious and uncertain sway annulled and undid to-day the labors of yesterday, carried on under a burning sun, and often under the fire of the enemy." These quotations are testimony of unbiased and highly intelligent eye witnesses of what they relate, far beyond the influence of hope or fear of the United States or Confederate Governments. I say "witnesses," for this statement is the result of the joint personal observation of the Prince de Joinville and his two nephews.

In this condition of things what was to be done? The enemy, as we have seen, did not find it necessary to retreat behind the intrenched and fortified works of his capital, but he showed himself on elevated and advantageous positions outside of those works. Thus posted we could not—it was entirely impracticable, in the state of things then existing, for Gen. McClellan to make an offensive demonstration. All he could do was to wait, and safety required that, while waiting, he should fortify his own position to enable him to resist attacks of the enemy. This he did, and the necessity of so fortifying was soon demonstrated, as we shall see.

The left wing of our army had crossed the river at Bottom Bridge, and the right wing remained on the other side to repel a flank movement of the enemy, as has been shown. The left wing proceeded on the railway leading from our base of supplies to Richmond, about half the distance from the river to the capital, to a station called Fair Oaks. A short distance south of the railway, and running in the same general direction, was the country road leading from Williamsburg to Richmond. On this road, south of Fair Oaks, and no great distance therefrom. is a place called Seven Pines. The left wing was formed of four divisions encamped on the Richmond side of the river, along the railway on either side. On the opposite side of the river lay the right wing of the army, consisting of five divisions and the resources. To pass from one end to the other would have made a journey of something like fifteen or twenty miles, but in so passing there was only one bridge to be crossed, and that was Bottom Bridge. The distance in a direct line between the extremities of these two wings was short. It was to unite the two arms of our forces that three or four bridges across the river were commenced. One alone was fit for use on 31st May, 1862. To defend the encampments of the left wing. entrenchments and rifle pits were dug at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. General Heintzelman with his two divisions crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge on the 25th May. This General says: "The next day I rode to the front and saw how the troops were posted. Engineers were sent over, and were directed to fortify a position about the Seven Pines. In making this forward movement there were frequent skirmishes that did not amount to much. We commenced two or three lines across the road and country there before we finally got located."

The commencement of a series of lines and fortifications furnishes the foundation for the charge brought by Senator Chandler, of Michigan, one of the War Committee, against General McClellan, in the utterance of which this Senator made the Senate Chamber ring on the 16th July, 1862. The charge was: "We found the worst swamp there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in the centre of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands and tens of thousands of lives of the bravest troops that ever stood on the face of God's earth, digging in front of the intrenchments and before the whipped army of the rebels." The state of facts which preceded this digging, and rendered it necessary, has been truly and faithfully described in plain prose, and now that the poetic muse of the Michigan Senator has had time to rest after her daring flight, I would ask him—were you authorized to make an attack so gross, and so utterly groundless upon a soldier who was doing what he could in circumstances most trying, to put down the

rebellion against his government by all the means of civilized warfare? Was it manly to assail one who could not reply? Whose mouth was closed by the proprieties of his position, as well as by the rules established for the government of that position. Mr. Chandler, you ought to be ashamed of this rude, and, I may add, vulgar assault. All the harm I wish you is that you should be tried and punished at their discretion, by the soldiers from Michigan, so highly eulogized by all who have fought under Major General McClellan.

On the 31st of May, only six days after Gen. Heintzelman had crossed the river, the enemy commenced in large force the attack upon the left wing of our army at Seven Pines; on that day and the next, there was fought at Seven Pines and at Fair Oaks one of the most sanguinary battles of the war, in which our arms repelled a force of the enemy greatly superior in numbers, and were on the last day victorious over that enemy.

In the record contained in a work recently published, entitled "*War Pictures from the South*, by B. Estvan, Colonel of Cavalry in the Confederate Army," the state of things among the Confederates which led to this attack is thus described: "In the meanwhile disease spread among our (the Confederate) forces to a considerable extent; virulent, obstinate fevers, caused by the miasma of the neighboring swamps, prevailed to a great extent, and the ravages that ensued became so great as to cause much anxiety to General Johntson. The deaths, indeed, were so numerous that sufficient persons could not be procured at Richmond to undertake the task of burying the bodies, which lay exposed in the church-yards by hundreds, spreading pestilence around. The medical faculty anticipated fearful consequences from this state of things, and General Johnston contemplated gloomily the inroads disease was hourly making in his brave army, which almost seemed as if it were doomed to sink altogether into an inglorious grave. In this dire emergency he resolved at all costs to attack his intrenched opponents."

What credit ought to be given to this record others can form their own judgment, I have no opinion to give.

It is not my object to give a descrlption of the battle of Fair Oaks; no charge has been made against General McClellan for the conduct of this battle; it was every way honorable to our arms and the result furnished good ground for rejoicing on our part. But it is charged against General Mc Clellan, that immediately after this battle he lost an opportunity which fairly offered to enter Richmond. The report says: "The officers engaged in that battle who have been examined testify that *the army could have pushed right into the city of Richmond with little resistance;* that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., that might impede their flight."

This I understand to mean that our soldiers composing the left wing of the army were bound to follow the rebels immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks into Richmond. So understood, the report of the committee is not supported by evidence, as I shall show. General Heintzleman says: "The next morning I learned that the enemy had retreated in great confusion, and on Sunday we gained nearly all the ground we had lost the day before. I sent General Hooker's half division forward, and sent an officer to General Richardson, who commanded one of General Sumner's divisions, and asked him to co operate with us, and find out what the enemy was doing. He saw General Sumner, but he said he could make no reconnoissance without orders from General McClellan. I sent my troops forward, and they got within about four miles of Richmond. They sent back word how far they had got, and I sent word to General McClellan. He ordered me to stop, and fall back on the old line. From information we got from the rebels I had no doubt we might have gone right into Richmond." This is the testimony of an officer engaged in the battle, and it hardly sus-

tains the declaration of the committee. General Sumner, also engaged in the battle, gives *no testimony* whatever to support the committee's report. General Joseph Hooker is asked by the committee: "Suppose that the next day after the repulse of the enemy at Fair Oaks, General McClellan had brought his whole army across the Chickahominy, and made a vigorous movement upon Richmond, in your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect of that movement?" To this question he replies: "That at no time during the whole of the campaign did I feel that we could not go to Richmond." The witness preferred to testify as to his "feeling," and not to give his judgment "as a military man," General Hooker is a wholesale swearer. But the general must be understood as giving it as his opinion that both wings of the army could have entered Richmond: for he is not inquired of as to "one wing.' General Keyes, who took a conspicuous part in the battle of Fair Oaks, and has testified in relation to it with great precision and deliberation says: "It would have been necessary, in my judgment, to have had a portion of the right wing of the army to enable us to follow the enemy into Richmond."

So, then, it is very clear that according to the testimony of the generals engaged in the battle who were examined as witnesses, that it was only by joining the right and left wings of the army that it would have been authorized to pursue the enemy into Richmond after the battle of Fair Oaks.

It will be recollected that there was but one bridge, Bottom Bridge, over which the right wing could have passed, and the wings of this line were so extended, that it would have taken all of two days to enable the right wing to pass over this bridge, and that such a movement if made, would have been attended with danger of having our whole army cut off from its base of supplies. It must be concluded, therefore, tnat it was impracticable, with the means at our command, to follow the enemy into Richmoud after the battle of Fair Oaks. General McClellan's own testimony on this point is very conclusive: "Question. Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks could you not have advanced on Richmond" If not, why not?" To which the general answers: "I do not think it would have been possible at that time to have taken our artillery with us. The result of which, independent of all other considerations, would have been to have brought us in front of the enemy's works at Richmond, without artillery, where they had heavy guns. That and the condition of the bridges were the principal reasons for not advancing at that time."

Ought not the committee to have been satisfied with that answer, especially as they failed in embarassing the general by the next question they put, which was: "The enemy retired, *after taking with them their artillery*, after their defeat, did they not?" A very adroit question this; but the general was too used to strategy to be caught; he therefore defeats the object of the committee by telling the simple truth in the most artless manner: "Answer. They had very few guns in action. I am not sure they had any guns. It was on their part almost entirely an infantry affair." I have done with Fair Oaks.

No. XIV.

GROSS INJUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE.

The *Tribune* edition of the committee report italicizes the following sentence: "*Gen. McClellan was with the main part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river.*"

Questions like the following were put to the witnesses examined by the committee.

Question—Where was Gen. McClellan during the fight at Williamsburg?

Answer—He remained at the camp near Yorktown.

Question—How far was that from the field of battle?

Question—Why was not the com-

manding general nearer at hand then?

Question—To General Sumner—Where was General McClellan during those battles? (Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.)

Question—Where was General McClellan during your second fight at Malvern?

The committee was appointed to inquire into "the conduct of the war." Questions like those quoted in respect to battles where success crowned our arms, and where, of course, the conduct of the war had been fully and satisfactorily shown, clearly manifest the intention of the committee to inquire into the conduct of General McClellan—to put him on trial. Senator Chandler's speech, already quoted, makes this intention still more palpable. Now, I know not but a committee might have been appointed by both Houses of Congress to inquire into the conduct of General McClellan or of any other officer in the army, and that such committee would not have been competent to pursue such an investigation. But it is clear that a committee thus constituted would, though not nominally, but really, have been in the nature of a judicial tribunal—a Court of Inquiry at least. Before a committee, or any tribunal of this character, the party whose conduct and character were subjects of investigation, ought to have a hearing, or, at least, to indicate the names of persons to be called as witnesses on his behalf. This seems to me a plain requirement, according to all fair and honorable proceedings. The report of such a committee against a general in the army would, in the eyes of many, of most persons, be regarded as a conviction, and popular condemnation would follow as an almost necessary consequence. Nothing more unjust can be well conceived than such a condemnation upon exparte testimony, without allowing the party most interested an opportunity of defending himself.

Now let us see what course was actually pursued by this committee. They called what persons they chose as witnesses, and they omitted to call such persons as they chose to exclude. The committee did not call Major General Fitz John Porter, who was as active and efficient before Yorktown and in the battles before Richmond as any general in the army General Howard, as we have before shown, was not called; nor Generals Meagher and Sickles, very intelligent and highly educated gentlemen, all of whom had personal acquaintance with the doings of our army on the Peninsula. Why were they not called? They had all expressed publicly their high admiration of Gen. McClellan. General McClellan himself was examined. If the committee really desired to know why this leader of the army did not personally mingle in the fights of his troops, or either of them, why was not the general himself questioned? Can it be doubted that he would have given a reason satisfactory to all military men. Very lately I met an officer of the American army whom I first knew when he was a mere youth of great promise in the celebrated academy at Jamaica, Long Island, and who has been in the military service of his government nearly fifty years, and, as a thoroughly educated military officer, has no superior in the country, if he has in the world, and he volunteered the declaration to me that in every situation in which he had been placed, General McClellan had done as well as he could, and that was as well as any other man could have done. I would give more for that piece of testimony, coming as it did from a gentleman of stainless integrity, and undoubted moral as well as physical courage, than for as many reports as the "War Committee" could write.

SUMMARY REVIEW.

It has been shown that General McClellan did right in not attempting to carry Yorktown by assault before he had laid siege to it, and that after the siege operations were completed, the post was evacuated without waiting for an assault. It has been shown that when the enemy evacuated he was pursued with great promptness and rapidity until he reached his next

fortified position at Williamsburg, and that, after a short but severe conflict there, he was compelled to retreat in all haste to his capital. It has also been shown that as soon as General McClellan had taken sufficient time to establish a base of supplies at the White House, he followed his retreating foe to the Chickahominy and beyond it, that he attacked and captured Hanover Court House, but failed, by no fault of his own, to form a junction with McDowell's command at the latter place; that he fought the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and repulsed the enemy in force vastly superior to his own on the second day of the fight, and that he was not prepared after these contests to enter Richmond for several reasons, and especially because he could not move his artillery against the fortifications of that capital.

Since the appearance of my article on "Yorktown" my attention has been directed to certain passages contained in a recent publication, entitled "The First Year of the War, by Edward A. Pollard," printed in Richmond. These passages are here transcribed.

'General Magruder, the hero of Bethel, and a commander who was capable of much greater achievements, was left to confront the growing forces on the Peninsula, which daily menaced him with an army of seventy-five hundred men, while the great bulk of the Confederate forces were still in motion in the neighborhood of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and he had no assurance of reinforcements. The force of the enemy was ten times his own; they had commenced a daily cannonading upon his lines; and a council of general officers was convened, to consult whether the little army of 7,500 should maintain its position in the face of tenfold odds, or retire before the enemy. The opinion of the council was unanimous for the latter alternative, with the exception of one officer, who declared that every man should die in the intrenchments before the little army should fall back. 'By G—, it shall be so,' was the sudden exclamation of General Magruder, in sympathy with the gallant suggestion. The resolution demonstrated a remarkable heroism and spirit. Our little forces were adroitly extended over a distance of several miles, reaching from Mulberry Island to Gloucester Point, a regiment being posted here and there, in every gap plainly open to observation, and on no other portions of the line, the men being posted at long intervals to give the appearance of numbers to the enemy. Had the weakness of General Magruder at this time been known to the enemy, he might have suffered the consequences of his devoted and self-sacrificing courage; but as it was, he held his lines on the Peninsula until they were reinforced by the most considerable portion of General Johnston's forces, and made the situation of a contest upon which the attention of the public was unanimously fixed, as the most decisive of the war."

From this historical record, it appears that Magruder's small force of 7,500 men, was spread out from Mulberry Island, in the James River, across the Peninsula to Yorktowu, and beyond to Gloucester Point, on the York River, opposite Yorktown. The 7,500 troops must therefore have ne uded the garrison in Yorktown. This is hardly credible, but he was enabled to hold his lines until *they were reinforced by the most considerable portion of Gen. Johnston's forces.* It follows, then, that after this reinforcement, Magruder was able to cope with our forces. The question is then—*at what time* was this reinforcement brought up? Fortunately we are able to ascertain this *point of time* without the aid of Mr. Pollard's history. I am compelled to reproduce here some extracts from the testimony heretofore given. Gen. McClellan testifies: "Movements of troops had been going on *some days before my arrival.* I remember that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been *crossed over to Yorktown* from the south bank of the James. I therefore hurried my own movements, and

started from Fort Monroe sooner than I would have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think the large masses of reinforcements arrived in Yorktown from one to two days before I reached its vicinity. JOHNSTON HIMSELF ARRIVED THERE THE DAY BEFORE I DID. Gen. Heintzelman says: "*By the time we got to Yorktown their army* (the enemy's) *had been largely reinforced.*"

I am not quite sure that Mr. Pollard's statements were entitled to so extended a notice; but the radical enemies of General McClellan would not scruple to use even the enemy's testimony to injure the general upon whose destruction they are intent, therefore this battery I trust has been silenced.

No. XV.
BEFORE RICHMOND.

After the battle of Fair Oaks, fought on the 1st day of June, 1862, our army remained before Richmond until General McClellan decided to change his base of operations by retiring across the Peninsula to James River, where the supplies of the army could be furnished by our navy. This decision was made on the evening of June 26th. Of the intermediate time between the battle of Fair Oaks and the movement towards the new base, I propose to treat in this number.

The committee bring no distinct charges against the General for misconduct of any sort except that they intimate strongly that the right division of our army should have been crossed over the Chickahominy, and formed a junction with the left division, on the Richmond side of this stream. Indeed, the committee seem to have been convinced that, without a junction of these two divisions, an attack on Richmond would have been inexpedient. The reasons for retaining one divisiion on the left side of Chickahominy have been already given. It was to prevent a movement of the enemy whereby our army would have been cut off from its base of supplies, the White House. Just here it seems to me that a portion of the testimony of General Henry T. Hunt will greatly enlighten the mind of the reader. He is asked: "But at Fair Oaks the enemy had been routed and been driven from their position, had they not?" Answer—"No sir, they had driven us from our position, and we re-took it. The country there was low and swampy, and the few lines which we could have advanced were those which had been prepared by the enemy, in the same way as the lines of our own position had been prepared by us. We were enabled, by means of an inferior force to hold our own against their combined attack. Being upon our own ground, we finally repulsed them. Had we changed positions and attacked them upon their own ground, being restricted by the nature of the ground to certain lines of attack which they had prepared, I think the result would have been different; probably a reverse to us. During the whole of that campaign, I considered that a serious reverse to us there would, in all probability, lead to the destruction of the army as an organized force." One cannot but be forcibly struck with the similarity of our position at Fair Oaks and the more recent great battle at Gettysburg. Had our army attacked the enemy's lines here, instead of being attacked on our own ground, who can be free from the apprehension that the "result would have been different, most probably a reverse to us"

"Question—Is it, then, your opinion that we were not strong enough at any time before Richmond to have coped with their army there?" Answer—"I cannot say that; we might have been successful, or might not have been, if we attacked. But I should have thought it imprudent or improper to have attacked, where there was not a fair prospect or a certainty of making the attack a sure thing. In that, however, I am merely giving my own judgmeat about the matter. The point is this; with the information we had of the strength of the enemy's forces; knowing that he had been preparing the ground, and had that advantage, that he was un-

encumbered with sick, his hospital being behind him: with all the advantage of an interior position and lines; the two armies were so much on terms of equality, as I judged from all I could learn from those whom I thought were well informed, that an attack of that kind would have been in the highest degree doubtful; and as long as there was a force within accessible distance, and there was any hope that it might join us, and enable us to bring the combined force to bear, I would have considered it imprudent to have made an attack." Question—"I did did not mean that the enemy, after the battle of Fair Oaks, should have been followed up by the same force that had defeated them, but that our whole force should have been brought across the Chickahominy directly after that battle, and moved on to Richmond." Answer—"I have known intimately the rebel commander at that place—General Johnston—and *I think that would have been exactly what he wanted and desired.*"

General Keyes is asked—"Why the army remained so long as it did with one portion on the right and the other on the left bank of the Chickahominy?" To which he answered—"Without being able to answer definitely, as I should if I had command of the army, I can state that I always supposed that the enemy would be able to cross the Chickahominy above where we were, and come down in the rear, and cut off our communication with the White House, which was the depot and base of our supplies, unless we had left a very strong force on the left bank of the Chickahominy." Gen. Keyes also testifies that he can give no military reason for permitting the army to remain after the battle of Fair Oaks inactive for so long a time; but he very properly adds: "I consider that the fact that I am not able to give a reason is very inconclusive, as I was not in a position to know what reasons influenced the commanding general to keep the army in such a condition.'

General McClellan is asked—"Did not the want of communication between the right and left wings of our army prevent you reaping those advantages which you might have otherwise obtained from the defeat of the enemy at Fair Oaks?" Answer—"I think that if there had been reliable communication between the right wing and the centre and left wing, we could have gained greater advantages by the battle."

These quotations from the evidence, and they could be multiplied, show conclusively that the committee utterly failed to convict General McClellan of want of professional ability or skill in not uniting the two wings of the army before they were united.

The testimony discloses copies of telegrams between the President, the Secretary of War, and General McClellan during the time under review, a summary statement of which shall be given.

On the 7th June, McClellan to the Secretary of War, informing that the Chickahominy River had risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth of three or four feet. The men were working night and day up to their waists in water to complete the bridges. "The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery, and even cavalry, except directly in the narrow road, which renders any general movement, either of this or the rebel army, utterly out of the question at present until we have more favorable weather." June 13—The same to the same: "The enemy are massing their troops near our front, throwing up earthworks on all the approaches to Richmond, and giving every indication of fight." June 14—"I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit for artillery to move; would be glad to know whether troops can be sent here;" urges the necessity of placing the troops sent from McDowell's command under his control, saying, "If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them. In no other way can they be of any assistance to me. The indications are, from our balloon

reconnoissances, and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in force and determination to fight desperately." June 18—Gives notice to the Secretary that rebel troops have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson. June 18.—Same day.—The President telegraphs that Jackson has been reinforced by ten thousand from Richmond. The President adds—"If this is true it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force." Same day McClellan rejoins—"If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." June 20—The President again telegraphs the General that a despatch had been received from Gen. Sigel corroborating the report that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond—suggesting that it may not be true; if he knew it was not true more force could be sent to McClellan, but as the case stood this could not safely be done.

There follows a detailed statement from the Adjutant General's office, showing that on the 20th June, 1862, McClellan's army contained as follows—"aggregate present for duty, 115,102; on special duty, 12,225; absent, 29,511. Total aggregate of present and absent, 156,808.

June 25.—McClellan to the Secretary of War, desiring particular information as to the position and movements of Jackson.

June 25–McClellan telegraphs: "I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true, but the army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity for reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate; but if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders. It must rest where it belongs. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements."

June 26.—The President to General McClellan: "The despatch suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act upon the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously, I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

"P.S.—General Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better towards the York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

"A. Lincoln."

I shall defer comments upon these facts (and this extraordinary postscript, too), briefly but fairly stated, until my next number; we have arrived at a most important point in the progress of the campaign. In the meantime, will the reader please direct his attention to the following inquiries:

1. Could General McClellan possibly have done anything more or better before Richmond than he actually performed?

2. Had he been reinforced, could he have taken Richmond?

3. Ought he not to have been reinforced?

I shall endeavor to discuss these

questions with fairness and candor in my next.

No. XVI.
CHANGE OF BASE.

My notice of the progress of the Army of the Potomac has been brought down to June 26th. On the next day, June 27th, 1862, the battle of Gaine's Mill was fought. Fair Oakes, it will be remembered, is on the right bank of the Chickahominy, the side towards Richmond; Gaines's Mill is on the left bank of this stream. At Gaines's Mill our forces were led by Gen. Fitz John Porter. The number of our forces engaged in that battle is variously estimated by the witnesses who have testified. Some put their number below, others above 30,000. The general in immediate command on our side puts our number above 30,000, and so would have stated had he been examined as a witness, but, strange to say, he was not called. It was evidently the theory which the committee endeavored to make out, that Porter's command should have been united to the command on the opposite side of the river before the battle of Gaines's Mill. On the other hand, Gen. Porter entertains the opinion that had he been reinforced by several regiments from the right bank of the Chickahominy he could have succeeded in effectually repelling the greatly superior numbers that assailed him, and, as a consequence, our troops could have assaulted the fortifications before Richmond. Indeed he does not hesitate to say that had he been furnished with 500 axes at the time when he sent for them by General Barnard, he might have successfully defended his position. But through some misapprehension or negligence, the request, which should have been delivered by Gen. Barnard at headquarters, was not delivered, and the necessary aid was consequently withheld. But it should be remembered that the generals in command on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy were expecting an attack, and were therefore reluctant to part with any part of their respective commands. General McClellan is asked: "As soon as you had reasonable cause to believe that the enemy proposed to attack you in force, should not the two wings of your army have been united to repel the attack? And was this done? And if not, why not?" Answer—"The right wing was drawn to the immediate vicinity of the bridges as soon as was practicable under the circumstances, after we knew definitely of Jackson's approach. The intentions of the enemy were difficult to divine. He apppeared in force on both banks of the Chickahominy, and made several sharp attacks on the right bank as well as the left. So that I do not think more troops could wisely have been sent to the support of Porter than were actually sent." Question—"Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as an attack was to be made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mills?" Answer—"I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were." This course of inquiry was closely pressed upon the general through a number of other questions, but he persists in testifying—"We had great difficulty in ascertaining the intentions of the enemy. I do not see that, under the circumstances at the time, we could have done differently from what we did do.'

After the conclusion of this battle, which was as bravely and obstinately fought as any battle during the war, it was finally decided by Gen. McClellan to change his base of operations to the James River; and our whole force, on the night of this battle, was withdrawn to the right bank of the Chickahominy; the last troops left about daybreak of the succeeding day. The trains commenced moving to James River that night, June 28, 1862. On the 27th June, 12M., McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War: "My change of position on other side is just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and two other divisions. Expect attack also on this

side." Same day, 3 P.M , Gen. McClellan's chief of staff telegraphs the Secretary of War: "We have been fighting all day against greatly superior numbers." "Our men fight like veterans, and will do all that men can do." At 20 minutes past midnight, morning of June 28th, McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War: "I know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several very strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do—all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove the most desparate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order; my regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers.

"Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to use tomorrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personal of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac.

"I have lost this battle because my force was too small; I again repeat I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortune; but to do this the government must view the matter with the same earnestness that I do; you must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. I should have gained this battle with ten thousand fresh men. If at this instant I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I would gain a victory to-morrow; I know that a few thousand men more would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly—I have seen too ma y dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that. The government has not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost."

Let this letter be read with care. It exhibits an earnestness which, if it had been properly met by the War Department, would have ensured the capture of Richmond; but it failed, as all previous appeals since the battle of Williamsburg had failed, to excite that vigor and activity on the part of the government which, beyond all peradventure, could have furnished, as before shown, the required reinforcements. Had there been the same earnestness manifested that has since been exhibited to take Vicksburg, or Charleston, or to repel the late invasion of Lee's army of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, General McClellan would have fulfilled his promise to take Richmond, and won the approbation and applause of his country and the world, and, more than that, would ere this time have suppressed the great insurrection. Why has the Army of the West been more successful than the Army of the Potomac? That army has not conquered superior numbers, behind their own fortifications, which General McClellan was expected to do, and which he has been censured for not doing. General Grant has not been thwarted and overruled in his plans, and in their execution, as McClellan was.

An hour before the letter above copied was sent by telegraph, General McClellan conferred with Gen. Heint

zelman. This officer testifies: "About 10 o'clock, P.M., June 27, I got a telegram that Gen. McClellan wished to see me immediately, about a mile and a half off. He had, in the meantime, established his headquarters on my side of the Chickahominy. I went over there, and found them all packed up, ready to move. The general stated the situation of affairs, and what he proposed to do. One thing was to move across to the James River. The other plan was to collect all the troops from my side of the Chickahominy and have a battle the next day, and throw everything upon the result of that battle. I asked him what would be the result if we lost. He said that if we were defeated the army would be lost, but that he was inclined to risk everything on that battle. I told him it was of vital importance to the country, I thought, to save that army; that we would be ruined if that army was lost; and I thought it would be better for us not to fight that battle, but to fall back from there to James River; that we could reach there with a loss of perhaps a few pieces of siege artillery and some wagons, and then we could receive reinforcements. He said that was his opinion; still he felt inclined to risk everything on a battle. The next day we commenced to retreat." Col. Alexander, of the engineer corps, on the 28th June, received instructions from Gen. McClellan to conduct a reconnoissance to James River for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any enemy on the road, and for ordering up supplies to the army, for he intended to march there. Thus it is evident that the commanding general did not rely exclusively on his own judgment in deciding on the important step he proposed to take, and that preliminary measures were carefully taken for the removal of the army.

The President sent a telegraphic reply to Gen. McClellan's letter: "June 28, 1862. Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. *It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government is to blame.*"

The last sentence in the President's telegram I have italicised, and shall comment upon it in my next number.

No. XVII.

"IT IS THE NATURE OF THE CASE, AND NEITHER YOU NOR THE GOVERNMENT IS TO BLAME."

This is the declaration communicated by the President of the United States to General McClellan on the 28th day of June, 1862, immediately after the battle of Gaine's Mill. The commander-in-chief acquits his subordinate general of all blame. With this the general might, so far as he was personally concerned, have been satisfied. But he did not concur in opinion with his superior officer; he thought that "the nature of the case" might have been entirely altered by supplying him with reinforcements, and that it was clearly within the power of the government to supply the reinforcements called for. The conclusion arrived at by the President prolonged the rebellion. The conclusion of General McClellan favored the immediate suppression of the rebellion. How came the President to arrive at his conclusion? He was led to believe that if he sent the reinforcements asked for, he would leave Washington unprotected. So he consoles himself and tries to console the general by saying: "If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the

price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington." That the President was wrong in his conclusion has been fully shown in these numbers. There was not a day after the army reached the Peninsula when General McClellan could not have been reinforced by more than 20,000 troops in addition to those already sent him without at all weakening the defences of Washington. The general could safely leave his whole military reputation to the decision of a competent military tribunal on this point. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether there was any better way to defend Washington than by sending troops directly to Richmond to assault it.

The President is not a military man, and was not a competent person to decide what force was required for the protection of Washington, nor how this force should be divided, nor where its divisions should be placed to effect this object. This is said with no intention of underestimating his abilities as a statesman. It is manifest that he did not rely on his own unassisted judgment in this particular; then the question arises, who misled him? who gave him bad advice?

It will be remembered that General McClellan began to call for reinforcements immediately after Yorktown was evacuated. On the 28th day of May he says: "It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger." Who in the whole army better understood what defences were required for the protection of Washington? Who could give a more reliable professional opinion on this point than General McClellan? General McDowell saw and urged the necessity of sending reinforcements. It has been stated recently in the newspapers that General Wadsworth was in favor of sending reinforcements.

The testimony of General Ethan Allen Hitchcock shows conclusively, I think, that he first gave the President the alarm in respect to the defences of Washington, and that too in the absence of Gen. McClellan. He may be regarded as the military authority upon whose advice the President acted in keeping back the reinforcements. General Hitchcock was not a general having any command, but was a cabinet adviser of the President in military matters. It may well be asked, ought the President to have any such irresponsible adviser? The Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief are at the head of the military department of the government, subject to the general supervision and control of the President himself, but not a particle more subject to such supervision and control than any other department of the government. The President is just as much entitled to select a private adviser in matters of finances, overlooking and ignoring the Secretary of the Treasury, as he has to select a secret adviser in military matters. There is no authority furnished by the testimony for saying that any of the commanders in the field dissented from the view above expressed by Gen. McClellan in reference to the defences of Washington, or concurred in the opinion upon which the President acted.

It thus appears that but for General Hitchcock, McDowell's corps would have been sent to the Peninsula—that reinforcements would have been sent sufficient to have effectually repulsed the enemy at Gaines' Mill, and had he been there so repulsed, there would have been no necessity for changing the base of operations, but the wing of the army on the right bank of the Chickahominy would have been able to enter Richmond.

It is easy for fancy to conjecture what effects would have followed had this result been reached at that time, more than a year ago. What an amount of treasure would have been saved to the country; what a number of valuable lives would have been preserved; what apprehensions, and fears, and alarms, and fearful forebodings we should all have been spared! Can any man say that General McClellan is to blame for not reaching this result? What more could he have done

than he did? Yet, strange to say, this joint committee have made him the subject of their censure. The country will judge between them and him.

No. XVIII.

The autumnal elections, even down to the Municipal election of the City of New York, are over. These numbers will now be resumed. I have felt an invincible reluctance to write or say anything in connection with the name of General McClellan with a view of influencing the elections of 1863, and my communications have therefore been for a time suspended.

The last conflict of the Army of the Potomac which has been noticed is the battle of Gaines' Mill. Since that battle was the subject of comment, Major General Fitz John Porter has published under his own signature important testimony in relation to it. No man is more capable of furnishing reliable testimony relative to this battle than General Fitz John Porter, since he was the principal actor in it on the side of our government. There can be no room for doubt, in a candid view of all the testimony, that if at that time General McClellan had been reinforced with the troops which he implored his government to send him, he could have taken Richmond.

Let us pause to contemplate the state of things on the Peninsula at the moment when General McClellan was forced to change his position in front of the rebel capital. I speak not now of the interference by the War Department with his original plan of operations, approved and sanctioned by that department, by withholding McDowell's force while our army lay before Yorktown, nor of preventing the junction of McDowell's and Fitz John Porter's commands at Hanover Court House; but if, after these omissions or blunders, twenty or even ten thousand fresh troops had been placed under McClellan's command, this general could have entered Richmond, in the face of superior numbers fighting behind their own intrenchments. Improbable as this may have seemed at the time, yet McClellan knew what his brave followers were capable of performing; and that he did not overestimate their power is proved by what they actually accomplished before the arrival of our army at Harrison's Landing. Although the enemy had the advantage of a defensive position behind their own intrenchments, yet even ten thousand fresh troops at Gaines' Mill, or at Malvern Hill, could have ensured the conquest of Richmond.

The excuse for not sending reinforcements is that all the troops in Virginia, not before Richmond, were required for the defence of Washington. It has already been shown that such an excuse is not a valid one. If there were not sufficient troops before Washington, or near it, for its protection, the whole country knows that one call from the President could have collected in one week from the loyal cities and States more than twenty-five thousand true and valiant men ready and eager to defend the capital of the country. Zeal for the cause of loyalty was at its highest pitch of fervor at the time when General McClellan commanded the Army of the Potomac.

Reinforcements were not sent, and Richmond was not taken. The omission to send these reinforcements was so clearly wrong that the conviction has forced itself upon many minds that the President, influenced by the advice of unwise or unpatriotic counselors, did not wish to take the rebel capital at that time by the instrumentality of General McClellan. But suppose this judgment to be an uncharitable one; suppose there was only an error of judgment on the part of the War Department, why should the blame for a failure of the Peninsular campaign be cast upon Gen McClellan? Why should he be held up to the country as the cause of this failure? Why should he be hunted, as he has been hunted, like a deer upon the mountains? He has been called a traitor—no soldier—a coward! What justification, what apology can be given for such persecution? Amidst all this manifestation of hatred and ma-

lignity, the subject of it has remained silent; when reviled he has not reviled again, but with care, industry, and patience he has written a history of his campaigns, fortified by official documents and correspondence, in a report made to the War Department. This report it is said he has asked permission to make public, so that the people, his fellow-citizens, may have all the evidence before them, to enable them to form a judgment upon his military career. But that permission is denied him, yet he remains silent; the articles of war will not permit him to speak; he acknowledges his obligation to obey those articles. The day cannot be far distant when justice shall be done this accomplished soldier and true patriot. All his declarations have been inspired by the loftiest patriotism. In a conversation with him, not public, he informed me that no peace with the rebels should be thought of until their military organizations were put down, nor until Northern men could be permitted to travel, visit or settle in the South, and have all their constitutional rights respected. This conversation was prior to the State election in Connecticut in April last, and in reference to that election.

Many months since Gen. McClellan was deprived of the command of the Army of the Potomac, that army which he loved, and which loved him. Little but disaster has befallen that army since he left it; thousands and tens of thousands of the brave men composing it, when he left the army, now fill honored graves. I feel confident that the impartial judgment of the country, when the full time arrives for the expression of that judgment, will be that these disastrous results would never have been beheld if George B. McClellan had been continued in command. Let this fact be pondered by all those who have been bereaved of relatives and friends in the disastrous battles which have been fought since the father of the Army of the Potomac was torn from his children. But these bereaved fathers, and mothers, and sons, and wives, and daughters are not the only persons who have cause of complaint and lamentation. All the soldiers of the Northern and Eastern and Middle States which composed the Army of the Potomac, and their friends and fellow-citizens at home, have just cause of complaint. They have been placed in a false position; they have been injured; the section of country in which they dwell has been made to suffer by a comparison with the inhabitants of another section; their reputation for valor and prowess has been breathed upon; their honor has been tarnished. If McClellan had taken Richmond; if McClellan had been left in command of the Army of the Potomac, no inference unfavorable to the valor and skill and manhood of Northern and Eastern troops would have suggested itself to any mind. Then the President of the United States would have had no occasion to write to a meeting of his fellow-citizens in the city of New York:

"You purpose also to celebrate our Western victories. Freed from apprehension of wounding the just sensibilities of brave soldiers fighting elsewhere, it would be exceedingly agreeable to me to join in a suitable acknowledgment to those of the great West, with whom I was born and have passed my life."

He had reason to be proud of his birth-place, "THE GREAT WEST," and but for his own interference he could have been spared the fear of wounding "the sensibilities of brave soldiers elsewhere."

No. XIX.

CHANGE OF BASE.

In my previous numbers I have not commented on the progress of our army after the battle of Gaines' Mill, when General McClellan decided to change the base of operations of that army. Since the appearance of Gen. McClellan's report there is no longer a necessity of continuing a narrative of the march of the army or its conflicts; they are all contained in that report, which I hope will be consulted by every citizen of the country. The campaign of the Peninsula is an

item so important in the conduct of the civil war in which the country is engaged, that without a full and accurate knowledge of it no citizen can pass an intelligent and just judgment upon the character of the present Administration. In view of the fact that this Administration seeks a continuance of its rule by the sufferages of the people, the report of Gen. McClellan should be carefully studied. It is a document so clear in its statements, bearing on its face the impress of truth, and verified by official correspondence and reports, that it may be relied upon as an authentic history. I wish it were possible that every voter in the country could be made acquained with the contents of this report—that it could be read by every citizen, or read to him, if from any cause he cannot give it a personal perusal.

That the Army of the Potomac did make a successful change of its base, and by an effectual resistance did repel all attacks made by the rebel army to prevent this change, and beat back with terrible slaughter the assailants; that the movements of our army on its march were by night, and the battles were through seven continuous days, are facts not disputed. The report shows that these movements and sanguinary conflicts, terminating in the arrival at the position sought to be reached, were not unpremeditated, accidental or fortuitous, but were planned and ordered and supervised by the general commanding the vast host comprising the army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan. Never before on the American soil was such a fete performed; there is no passage in the military history of our country so luminous as that which records the doings of our army during those seven days. It is doubtful whether any act or series of acts has shed such lustre on our arms in the view of scientific and experienced military men in Europe as the movements of our army in retiring from the Chickahominy to the James, in the face of a foe superior in numbers and led by able commanders. No one military exploit in the progress of this civil war has done more to admonish foreign powers that it would be dangerous to interfere with the operations of the lawful government of the country to suppress the rebellion, and therefore to prevent such interference.

Even Pollard, the Confederate historian of the war, is compelled to admit with reluctance, that "the skill and spirit with which Mc lellan had managed to retreat was indeed remarkable, and afforded no mean proofs of his generalship. At every stage of his retreat, says this author, he had confronted our forces with a strong rear guard, and had encountered us with organized lines of battle. and regular dispositions of infantry, cavalry and artillery. His heavy rifled cannon had been used against us constantly on his retreat. A portion of his forces had now effected communications with the rivers at points below City Point. The plan of cutting off his communication with the river, which was to have been executed by a movement of Holmes' division between him and the river, was frustrated by the severe fire of the gunboats, and since that the situation of the enemy appeared to be that of division or dispersion of his forces, one portion resting on the river, and the other to some extent involved by our lines."

"It had been stated to the public of Richmond, with great precision of detail, that on the evening of Saturday the 28th of June, we had brought the enemy to bay on the south side of the Chickahominy, and that it only remained to finish him in a single battle. Such in fact appeared to have been the situation. The next morning, however, it was perceived that our supposed resources of generalship had given us too much confidence; that the enemy had managed to extricate himself from the critical position, and, having massed his forces, had succeeded under cover of the night in opening a way to the James River."

"Upon this untoward event, the operations of the army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy were

to follow a fugitive army through a country where he had admirable opportunities of concealment, and through the swamps and forests of which he had retreated with the most remarkable judgment, dexterity and spirit of fortitude."

Thus much for the testimony of our enemy. The commander and historian of the Army of the Potomac was fully authorized to say :—" The seven days are classical in American history ; those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back beaten and shattered the entire Eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place for rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James."

Hear the testimony from Europe. Mr. Motley, our Minister at the Court of Vienna, thus writes to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, in October, 1862. The letter will be found in the diplomatic correspondence communicated to Congress by the Secretary of State, pages 569 and 570. Extract: " In this connection I deem worthy of your notice a brief extract from a remarkable series of papers in the principal military journal of this empire, in which the course of our campaigns is criticised, sometimes severely, but never ungenerously ; always with talent, and with thorough knowledge of the subject, topographically and strategically, and with a firm disposition to do justice. You will be interested to read the comments of so able a writer upon the withdrawal of our armies from the James River.

" It is not to be wondered at, then, if the general-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac was in haste to save the army intrusted to him from the dangers surrounding it, even from certain destruction ; from a noose, in fact, which required only to be drawn a little closely together in order to suffocate the soul of the Union. The manner in which he acquitted himself of this most difficult of all military tasks redounds to his infinite honor, and places him at once in the ranks of those memorable commanders whose name history treasures for posterity ; men who, if they have perhaps, not had the art to chain victory to their banners, possessed, at any rate, the fortitude, the audacity, and the circumspection to rescue their armies from impending ruin * * * The American general has made a thorough study of war in the swamps of the Chickahominy, and has made himself a complete master in that most difficult of professions. * * * He has manifested the unquestioned talent to save his army, in a manner not sufficiently to be admired, out of the most desperate of situations. Moreau made himself immortal by his famous retreat from the Iller to the Rhine in the year 1796. What is due to the American general-in-chief who conducted, with a morally and physically exhausted army, through a swampy pathless country, covered with ancient forests, and in face of an enemy outnumbering him two to one the most classical of all retreats recorded in military history, without a single disaster ? "

No doubt this criticism, from a high military source, in an empire thoroughly instructed in the art of war, must have been highly gratifying to our distinguished ambassador himself, the author of histories which are classics in our language. Similar emotions must have swelled the hearts of all our loyal countrymen in Europe at the time. With far different feelings, however, were the commendations of our American general regarded by the Committee on the Conduct of the War; they could easily sacrifice their country's renown to gratify their personal dislike for General McClellan.

It is a fact familiar to the student of history that the military renown of armies and the nations they served, has been often as much heightened by skilful and well-ordered retreats from situations of peril as by successful assaults. The famous retreat of the ten

thousand Greeks under their leader Xenophon, needs only to be mentioned in this connection. The hardly less famous retreat of Moreau in 1796 has been adverted to by Mr. Motley. In the war between this country and Great Britain in 1812-15, our navy performed exploits highly distinguished, and greatly elevated our national character.

In the early months of that war, when we had experienced little but disasters on the land, it was truly said "Our little navy has dragged up by the locks the drowning honor of our country." But of all the feats of that navy in this memorable war, there was not one that reflected greater honor upon the naval arm of the service than the masterly escape of Captain Isaac Hull when in command of the frigate Constitution from a squadron of British vessels, consisting of a razee of sixty-four guns and four frigates, after a close pursuit of three days and nights. This display of American seamanship was viewed with admiration and astonishment by the greatest naval power in the world.

I purpose to conclude this series of articles in two more numbers; one, on the order of the General-in-Chief (Halleck), to General McClellan, to remove the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, and the protest of the latter general against this order. The other number on the letter of General McClellan to the President, dated July 7, 1862, concluding in these words, remarkable for their solemnity: "I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country."

When these numbers arecompleted they will, in compliance with numerous and urgent requests from distinguished persons in many parts of the loyal States, be collected and published in pamphlet form for general circulation. To some extent the distribution of these pamphlets must be gratuitous. Persons wishing to contribute to the expense of such distribution, will please communicate with the *Journal of Commerce*, which has consented to receive such contributions.

No. XX.

ORDER TO LEAVE THE PENINSULA.

On the 3d of August, 1862, General Halleck ordered General McClellan to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. On the next day, while making preparation for this important movement, General McClellan sends a remonstrance to the general-in-chief, entreating him, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, to rescind this order. In this remonstrance, couched in language most respectful, he argues the point with great earnestness and power, and concludes in these words: "If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of my power, directing to the movements, which I clearly foresee will be of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be—and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country."

This entreaty was unavailing—the order was not rescinded.

Now the country well knows what has been the sad experience of the Army of the Potomac since, in obedience to this fatal order, it marched from the Peninsula. In every great battle, on the soil of Virginia, this army has been defeated with immense loss in killed and wounded. At Bull Run under Pope; at Fredericksburg under Burnside; at Chancellorsville under Hooker, thousands and tens of thousands of our bravest and most loyal troops have been slain or disabled. Families without number have been bereaved of husbands and fathers, of sons and brothers and kindred, or have been compelled to see them crippled or maimed. These are sad results—were they inevitable? Might they not have been avoided by following the counsel of General McClellan?

The counsel was to reinforce the army where he was, and from that point, with the reinforced army, march on Richmond. Hear what he says: "This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communication as now secure.

We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) ten miles of Richmond.

"At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

"From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I deem it impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land.

"The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundrend and forty-five miles (145) miles to reach a point now only 25 miles distant and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation.

"Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would induce foreign powers to recognize our enemies; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable it to assume the offensive.

"It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington or Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army in the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation.

"All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided."

True, this army has retrieved its tarnished reputation at South Mountain and Antietam under McClellan, and at Gettysburg under Meade. But let it be remembered that in these conflicts it was defending the soil of loyal States, not invading the region of rebellion. This army was repelling and driving back the rebel hosts who had the audacity to invade the territory of the loyal States. We only prevented by these victories, and barely prevented, the States which had been true to the lawful government of the country from being overrun, and their cities, including the national capital itself, from being assaulted and sacked. Were these results caused solely by the order to abandon the Peninsula? Not entirely. It should be remembered that McClellan was not only ordered to march from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek, but was deprived of his command of that army when it joined the Army of Virginia. If he had been directed when he left the Peninsula to unite the Army of the Potomac, with the Army of Virginia under Pope, and take command of the two armies united, the disaster of Bull Run would not, it is believed, have occurred. This is a question which the military men in those armies are most competent to decide; but I have no doubt their decision would conform to the opinion above given. One thing is very certain, that the officers and privates of these armies knew and had confidence in McClellan; they did not know, and to a large extent had no confidence in Pope.

This fact is proved by the evidence of General Burnside, given before a court-martial. Why was this command withheld from General McClellan? He outranked General Pope. For the same reason, I fear, that the original plans of McClellan, when he went to the Peninsula, were interfered with and defeated; for the same reason that McDowell was kept back from joining Porter at Hanover Court House; for the same reason that reinforcements, repeatedly called for, were not sent to the Peninsula. There was no desire on the part of irresponsible military advisers of the President, inferior in rank to McClellan, that this general should capture Richmond, and gain the credit and influence that such a victory was sure to give him. Hence the mind of the President was kept, by generals at Washington, in a state of constant apprehension, not to say alarm, as to the safety of the capital. One call from the War Department requiring volunteers for the defence of Washington, issued at any time during the months of April or May 1862, would have filled all the garrisons in and about the capital with some of the best and well drilled volunteers in the States of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, within ten days after making the call. It is a notorious fact that such volunteers in large numbers were not only willing but desirous—eager for such a service. This, from what I saw here in New York, I affirm without fear of contradiction.

It will be observed that my comments refer solely to the consequences of occurrences on the Peninsula. What General McClellan could have done in command of the united armies before the battle of Bull Run was demonstrated by what he actually did with these armies after they were demoralized by defeat. When even the President of the United States said that the troops defeated under Pope would not fight, those troops were collected, organized, and led on to victory under the general they loved. It is not my purpose to speak of what might have been done by General McClellan if he had not been seperated from his command, after the battle of Antietam.

But it may be enquired—"Why remind the country of these things now? It is not patriotic to allude to the errors or mistakes of the past, while the rebels are yet unconquered, and even confident of success; the country even now has need of United sentiment and action to put down the great rebellion." Admitted; yet it is nevertheless useful to examine and criticise the past, in order to prevent the recurrence of errors in the future. Let us all hope that now a more wise and efficient policy will be pursued.

There are few citizens of the loyal States who do not concur in the sentiments long since uttered and published by General McClellan in these words: "*I am in favor of the prosecution of the war with all the means at the command of the loyal States until the military power of the rebellion is destroyed.*" When the *military* power is destroyed there may be a wide difference of opinion as to the policy to be inaugurated and pursued as to the States in rebellion. One party it is feared will advocate a vindictive policy inspired by hatred and revenge. The other party, which is is hoped and believed will be the prevailing one will temper mercy with justice–will endeavor by all the means practicable once more to unite the whole people of these United States in cordial support of the Constitution made by their fathers. Let us not now, in anticipation of the coming conflict of opinion, to be settled, it is hoped, at the ballot box, be seperated upon the question of present duty. That duty is plain.

In order to overcome military power, military power must be resorted to. This power can only be wielded with any hope of success by those trained to its exercise. The profession of arms must be learned by study, and drill and experience. The qualifications of a great military commander are most graphically sketched and eloquently described by Edmund Burke:

"The fortitude required of him is very different from the unthinking alacrity of the common soldier or common sailor in the face of danger and death. It is not a passion, it is not an impulse, it is not a sentiment, it is a cool, steady, deliberate principle, always present, always equable, having no connection with anger, tempering honor with prudence, incited, invigorated, and sustained by a generous love of fame; informed, moderated, and directed by an enlarged knowledge of its own great public ends; flowing in one blended stream from the opposite sources of the heart, and the head, carrying in itself its own commission, and proving its title to every other command by the first and most difficult command, that of the bosom in which it resides. It is a fortitude which unites with the courage of the field the more exalted and refined courage of the council; which knows as well how to retreat as to advance; which can conquer as well by delay as by the rapidity of the march or the impetuosity of an attack; which can be with Fabius, the black cloud that lowers on the tops of the mountains, or, with Scipio, the thunderboalt of war; which, undismayed by false shame, can patiently endure the severest trial that a gallant spirit can undergo, in the taunts and provocations of the enemy, the suspicions, the cold respect, and 'mouth honor' of those from whom it should meet a cheerful obedience, which, undisturbed by false humanity, can calmly assume that most awful moral responsibility of deciding when victory may be too dearly purchased by the loss of a single life, and when the safety and honor of their country may demand the certain sacrifice of thousands."

When a military leader is found embodying the characteristics here described, he must not be interfered with, much less controlled; he must be let alone to work out his own plans by subordinate officers and agencies of his own selection. President Lincoln is a professional man; he is a lawyer, and has, no doubt, in the course of his professional practice, been entrusted by his clients with very important cases, involving large amounts of property, great public interests, as well as the liberty and life of the citizen. In every such case I can readily imagine that, after making himself thoroughly acquainted with the facts and the law applicable to the same, he has insisted upon his professional right to manage the controversy in his own way, without the interference even of his client. Such interference is I know, never permitted by any lawyer of reputation; no such counsellor will be responsible for the result of a cause unless committed to his sole control. These principles are equally applicable to the profession of arms. Let us hope that in General Grant the country has found a military commander worthy of the high trust committed to him. This general has by the nomination of the President, and the concurrence of Congress, been placed at the head of the armies of the country. In making this selection the whole constitutional duty of the President in this regard has been performed. If General Grant fails, no censure will attach to the President, unless he has attempted to interferfere with the discharge of the general's professional duty. The President may certainly congratulate himself that he is relieved from all the care and anxiety of managing the armies in the field. The President never made a greater mistake than to assume, because he was commander-in-chief under the Constitution, that, therefore, he was required to direct the military operations of the armies. He has, however, more than once made just this mistake. Should it be repeated, no weight of odium is too heavy to cast upon the President, for he too is none other than the agent of the people not the government, but the chief executive officer selected by the people to administer a government whose powers are prescribed and defined by a written Constitution. There are not a few intelligent citizens who predict that General Grant is called

to Washington to be made instrumental in advancing party objects, as well as to control the armies. Such, it is not to be believed is the purpose of the general himself, but he may nevertheless be made subservient to party purposes. If General Grant is determined to destroy the military power of the rebellion, and perseveres in that determination, and is not interfered with by the President or War Department, he will, beyond all doubt, succeed. If however, he allows himself to become a tool of party, his success in putting down the rebellion cannot be relied on, and he will, personally, be disgraced and ruined in reputation.

No. XXI.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

I had proposed to finish this series of communications in this number, but an editorial article in the New York Times of the 15th March, numbered six of a series published in that paper, reviewing the report of General McClellan, requires a notice, and I am therefore prevented from executing my original purpose.

The "New York Times" supports the Administration. To this there can be no objection if that support is rendered fairly and ingenuously. There are two modes of misrepresentation and giving false coloring to facts; one by allegations that are not true, and the other by suppressing the truth what in legal technicality is called *suggestio falsi* and *suppressio veri*. Both of these maxims have been violated by the Times in the article referred to, and another maxim adopted which has not found a place in any approved code of morality: "All is fair in politics."

The first great wrong done to Gen. McClellan, after it was decided that he should move on Richmond by the way of the Peninsula, was the withholding of Gen. McDowell's corps, which had been promised him, as has been previously shown in these numbers. Had not that corps been kept back, and the good faith of the Administration thereby violated, the result of the Peninsular campaign would have been widely different from what it was. Had the fact been disclosed to General McClellan, before he embarked for Fortress Monroe, that he was not to have the aid of McDowell's command, he doubtless would never have embarked—would have regarded the enterprise of taking Richmond as impracticable. But this fact was not communicated to the General till he arrived at Yorktown, when it was too late to recede. All the plan of his campaign, deeply to his regret and I may add grief, was thereby deranged. These facts are well known to the Times, and the only way in which the Administration can relieve itself of public censure is by showing that it had been previously deceived by Gen. McClellan. This has been attempted before by Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a brigadier general of volunteers, who held staff relations with his Excellency the President and the Secretary of War. I have heretofore commented at large on this attempt made by Hitchcock; it is now renewed by the Times, with what success we shall see.

The charge against General McClellan is, that when he embarked with his army at Alexandria for the Peninsula he violated the President's order "to leave Washington entirely secure." That order was issued by the President, and bears date March 13th, 1862, and is in these words:

To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan:

"The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objections to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

"1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"2d. Leave Washington entirely secure.

"3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the

army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

This order is not given in the Times article, an omission which could not have been made by a fair and candid reviewer, sincerely desirous of establishing the truth, especially when he quoted in full a previous order bearing date the 8th of March. By every approved rule of construction the order of the 8th of March was superseded by the order of the 13th of March. By this order the plan of operations which had been agreed upon by the commanders of army corps *was not objected to*, neither was it expressly approved, but the direction to General McClellan personally in the order of the 13th of March was: "LEAVE WASHINGTON ENTIRELY SECURE; this was mandatory to the commanding general. What should constitute security is left to his judgment, and he is not concluded by the judgment of his corps commanders before expressed, or thereafter to be expressed; but the plain import of the order is: "I look to you, the general-in-chief, to leave Washington entirely secure."

The preparations of General McClellan, he informs us, were at once begun in accordance with directions in the order of March 13th. He shows by official documents what he did. A fair judgment deduced from these documents must decide whether he executed the order with sound judgment and in good faith. These documents are not given, nor are their contents stated in the Times' article, but they are adverted to as "a shuffling attempt which General McClellan makes to explain this matter."

The first of these documents is an order dated March 16th, 1862, and issued to Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, containing specific directions what that General should do, and stating the general object of the order to be "to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington."

The second is directed to Brigadier General Wadsworth, bearing the same date, March 16th, 1862. There are various other orders and official communications bearing on the safety of Washington in the report of General McClellan, but they may all be summed up in the following paragraph in the same report:

Without including Gen. Blencker's division, there were left 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I deemed more than adequate to insure Washington against any force the enemy could bring against it. The general gives at large the reasons for this opinion. Among these reasons is the following, which I think no one but "The New York Times" would regard as "a shuffling attempt to explain away this matter." (The charge of having left Washington unprotected.)

"It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement of the army to the Peninsula would have the effect to draw off the rebel army from Manassas to the defence of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. This opinion was confirmed the moment the movement commenced, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our intentions; for, with the exception of Jackson's force of some 15,000, which his intructions show to have been intended to operate in such a way as to prevent McDowell's crops from being sent to reinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude made its appearance in front of Washington during the progress of our operations on the Peninsula; nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's Landing was Washington again threatened."

So anxious was the general to satisfy the President and Secretary of War, that he was about to leave Washington in a state of perfect security, so as to relieve their minds from all anxiety or apprehension on this point, that he was at pains to see General Hitchcock, the only military man who held staff relations with these high officials. Here what the General says in his report:

"It is proper to remark, that just

previous to my departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief of staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff relations with his Excellency the President and Secretary of War, to submit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washington, and the positions in which I designed posting them. Gen. Hitchcock after glancing his eye over the list, observed that he was not the judge of what was required for defending the capital, that Gen, McClellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and he presumed that if the force designated was in his judgment sufficient, nothing more would be required. He was then told by the chief-of-staff that I would be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced officer. To this he replied, that as I had had the entire control of the defences for a long time, I was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give any expressions of opinion at that time."

General Hitchcock at that time—before the General embarked—took the right view of the matter—that Gen. McClellan was a better judge of the requirements for the safety of the capital than himself, and that his judgment must control. Who has been found from that day to this, to impeach the correctness of General McClellan's decision? The capital was not put in danger while the army remained on the Peninsula, nor was the retention of McDowell's command necessary for its protection. This is the testimony of actual experience, one of the best witnesses. Before the war committee General McClellan was asked: "Was it not almost certain beforehand that the withdrawal of your army to a position where it did not cover Washington would cause the enemy at least to make a threat or feint of an attack upon Washington which would lead to a panic, and perhaps to a recall of your army, or a portion of it? Answer—I think not; I do not think that anything occurred, prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain, which should have justified a panic in Washington. The only advance of the enemy that I remember at all was that of Jackson upon Gen. Banks. When I heard of that I telegraphed to the President that I believed the intention simply to be to prevent reinforcements being sent to to me. I had no idea that it meant a serious threat upon Washington,"

I have carefully read the testimony of Generals McDowell, Sumner, and Heintzelman, before the War Committee, and cannot find that either of them was examined in reference to the sufficiency of the force left by General McClellan for the defence of Washington. They were witnesses, next to General McClellan, most competent to give an opinion upon the point. No opinion was sought from either of them. General McDowell was desirous of uniting his command with that of General McClellan, and earnestly protested against the alleged necessity of retaining it in the vicinity of Washington. Yet it was retained, and accomplished no useful purpose, while, if it had embarked in the first instance, and gone down to Fortress Monroe with the other corps, or if it had united with the command of Gen. Fitz John Porter at Hanover Court House the capture of Richmond would have been made certain. Who can fail to see that the distribution of the troops for the defence of the capital, whether in the immediate vicinity of the capital, or at a greater or less distance from it, in the avenues through which the enemy must of necessity approach Washington, were questions for military science and experience to decide. General McClellan, as the commander of the army, did decide these questions, and made these distributions in the exercise of his best judgment. There is no testimony whatever but that of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, and, perhaps, I may add, Wadsworth, tending to show that his decision was erroneous. The evidence of these witnesses has been heretofore in these numbers examined, but I may be pardoned, just in this connection, for again adverting to the topic. Gen. McClellan in his re-

port says: "On the 21st day of April, the day following my departure for Fort Munroe, Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of War to examine and report whether the President's instructions to me of March 8th and 13th had been complied with. On the same day their report was submitted, and their decision was that the requirement of the President, that this city (Washington) shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." I have shown, I think, conclusively, that the order of March 8th was superseded by the subsequent order of March 13th. It was very proper to enquire whether, under this order, the safety of Washington had been provided for. That question could only be decided by ascertaining what troops and armament had been left for such defence. No such investigation was made, but the attention of these two generals was directed to an enquiry whether or not the force agreed upon by the corps commanders had been left, and distributed in the manner suggested by them in their report.

A proper investigation would have shown that a much larger force than was suggested by either of the corps commanders was actually left for the defence of the capitol, although the force was, under the direction of the general-in-chief, distributed in a different manner than that contemplated by the corps commanders.

Generals Hitchcock and Thomas assume that the report of the corp commanders prescribed a rule of duty to Gen. McClellan. I deny it, and have shown that the only duty required of him by the President was defined in the last order given—*leave Washington perfectly secure.* If he did provide, that which, in his own judgment, was perfect security, he obeyed the order. I have heretofore shown the gross injustice of putting Major Gen. McClellan, in his absence, on trial before generals of inferior rank, and bringing in a report against him without giving him a hearing, or any notice of an enquiry the result of which might be, and actually was, injurious to his reputation. This enquiry and report was made while the general himself, at the head of the largest army ever before assembled in these United States, was absent in the actual and perilous service of his country

General McClellan further states, in reference to the time when the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas was made, as follows: "At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any approach to Washington was Jackson's force, in front of Banks's, in the Shenandoah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Railroad leading from this valley to Washington, and it will be admitted, I presume, that Banks, occupying the Shenandoah Valley, was in the best position to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. The number of troops left by me for the defences of Washington, as given in my letter to the Adjutant General, were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and these, of course, I constitute the most trustworthy and authentic source from which such information can be obtained.'

In consequence of this report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, made to the War Department, the President's apprehension for the safety of Washington was excited, in consequence of which he wrote a letter to General McClellan, on the 9th of April, in which he inquires of this General—"And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be prevented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops?"

Here the President plainly implies that no troops could be placed anywhere to resist an attack upon Washington except immediately in front of the Capitol. Could any conclusion be more erroneous, not to say absurd?

In reference to another part of the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, General McClellan says in his report: "In regard to the steamer 'Merrimac,' I have also stated, that so far as our operations on York River were concerned, the power of this

vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that conclusion.

"Previous to our departure from the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe, to consult with Flag Officer Goldsborough upon this subject. The result of that consultation is contained in the following extract from the evidence of Admiral Goldsborough before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, viz., 'I told Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac going up York River, that she could never get there, for I had ample means to prevent that.' Capt. J. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the Committee as follows: 'Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised it should be done.'"

There is further given the testimony of Gen. Keyes to the same effect, which will be found in the Report of Gen. McClellan.

Thus much for this infamous proceeding at Washington, instituted and consummated by Generals Hitchcock and Thomas and the Secretary of War, immediately on Gen. McClellan's leaving Washington, on a mission no less important than the conquest of the rebel capital. This proceeding, which resulted in the withholding of Gen. McDowell's corps from the Peninsula, prevented that conquest. But for this trial and conviction of Gen. McClellan in his absence, and without notice, the rebel capital would have been in the possession of the lawful government of this country more than eighteen month ago, and MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN would, by general acclamation, have been hailed as the savior of his country. That he has not been is no fault of his own.

NO. XXII.

NEW YORK TIMES.

In my last number I attempted to answer Article No. 6, in "the New York Times" review of General McClellan's report — with what success the careful and candid reader must decide. No. 7, in the same journal, shall now be noticed, and then, I have no more to do with "the New York Times."

No. 7 censures General McClellan for not having *assaulted* the enemy's lines at Yorktown instead of *laying siege* to his line of works. In the remarks of "the Times" our own general is treated with marked contempt. A comparison between him and the Duke of Marlborough is instituted greatly to the disadvantage of our countryman. Such a comparison was uncalled for. General McClellan, before he was summoned from the pursuits of civil life, and it may be added the profitable pursuits of civil life, to enter the service of the country, and assist in putting down the rebellion, had been educated in the military academy at West Point, and seen some actual service in the Mexican war, but he had never risen in the regular army above the grade of captain. He had retired from even this military position, and he sought not to enter military life a second time, but he was called from his retirement to that service, and, prompted by love of country, and gratitude to a government which had given him a military education, he promply obeyed that call. From the day he re-entered the army to the day when he was relieved of his command by order of the President, he addressed himself diligently to the duties of his calling in the position assigned him No man can deny him this meed of praise; he was industrious, watchful, and persevering by day and by night; he did the best he could with all fidelity to his government. I am unauthorized, upon authority which cannot be gainsaid, to declare that the President of the United States, after the battle of Antietam, expressed the highest confidence in this general's military capacity and generalship, believing him superior to any and every other general in the service, with no fault but being in his opinion *too cautious*.

Now this recent captain made no

claim to the abilities and experience of the greatest general that England, through a course of centuries, has produced—the illustrious Duke of Marlborough. When General McClellan went to the Peninsula he commanded, indeed, the largest army ever before assembled in his native country—he did not usurp that command; he did not intrigue for, or even solicit this command; but it was conferred upon him, inexperienced as he was. He accepted it, and did the best he could. Impartial, judicious military men, have said that he did as well and accomplished as much as any other general, ancient or modern, could have done, or accomplished, in his position, under all the circumstances which actually existed. This is all that can be said about it. It is ungenerous to taunt him because he did not, in the first act of his first great campaign, rise to an equality with the renowned Duke of Marlborough. The Committee on the Conduct of the War took a large amount of testimony on this disputed point of assault or siege. I have heretofore examined in the numbers referred to this testimony, given on both sides, with as much candor and impartiality as I was able, and shown that the testimony in favor of siege greatly preponderated. The witnesses examined were of the committee's own selection, and they were selected with no partiality for General McClellan, yet the result of this testimony, and of the public authentic documents accessible to the committee, was entirely favorable to the siege. Many other officers could have been examined, and it would have been entirely practicable to examine, on this point, Lieut.-Gen. Scott himself. What their judgment would have been it is impossible to say, but there can be no doubt that an overwhelming majority of the rank and file of the whole army would have ratified the decision of the commanding general. Certain it is, that on the 6th of May, two days after the evacuation by the enemy, the Congress of the United States voted thanks to Gen. McClellan *for those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of life.* One would think that controversy on this point should cease. Not so thinks the "New York Times." This journal makes no reference to the testimony taken before the War Committee; it takes no notice of the reports of our own generals; it ignores the opinion of the Army of the Potomac, the most enlightened body of citizen soldiers ever combined; it does not even mention the resolution of Congress; it enters into no discussion whatever upon the question, but pronounces, *ex cathedra*, a sentence of condemnation of General McClellan for having laid siege to Yorktown. The article in the "Times," now reviewed, opens thus: "There is now, we suppose, not the shadow of a doubt, that had the Army of the Potomac been simply allowed to *walk* on up to Richmond, it would have been able to walk over all the force which Gen. Magruder had to oppose it. We now *know* how contemptible that force was." The italics are not mine.

Suppose this assertion to be true: General McClellan, in April, 1862, could not act upon what we *now* know, and of which he was then ignorant. All he could do was to use the best means then in his power, and collect the most reliable information attainable *at that time*, as to the number and condition of the enemy, and act upon that information. He might have been misinformed; he might have failed to obtain accurate information; instances might be cited where great generals have been deceived without any fault or remissness of their own. But how do we *now* know what our army could have accomplished, more than it did accomplish before Yorktown two years ago? The "New York Times" answers this question in the following sentence: "General Magruger's official report of the operations on the Peninsula shows that his whole army consisted of eleven thousand men; of these six thousand were useless to him, being placed in garrison at Gloucester Point, Mulberry Island, &c.; so that it will be seen," adds he, "that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was

defended by about *five thousand men.*" "Says" who? General Magruder. And who is General Magruder? He is the witness—the CHIEF witness produced by the accuser and reviler of General McClellan, and the public are entitled to know the position and character of this witness by whose testimony it is sought to condemn our own general. General Magruder is a rebel officer; he was well and extensively known when he served under the United States Government. The officers of our regular army are not ignorant that his characteristics were, first, a great amount of pomposity and desire of show in his personal bearing; second, a habit of appropriating to General Magruder a lion's share of all the credit and renown which attached to every military enterprise in which he happened to be engaged; third, he was habitually in a state of artificial excitement, sometimes called intoxication, but more commonly, drunkenness; and, lastly, he is universally known as a *traitor* to his lawful government, which educated him to the profession of arms. Behold the witness put upon the stand by the "New York Times," to blacken the character of General McClellan! What says this general as to the force of the enemy when he arrived at Yorktown? He testifies before the War Committee that when Gen. Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula there was not at *that time* much more than Gen. Magruder's command, which had been always estimated from 15,000 to 20,000. It will be remembered that Gen. Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula, not at Yorktown, but at Fortress Monroe, thirty miles from Yorktown. The general proceeds in his testimony: "Movements of troops had been going on across the James River to the Peninsula for some days before my arrival. I remember that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been crossed over to Yorktown from the south bank of the James. I therefore hurried my own movements, and started from Fort Monroe sooner than I should have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think that the large masses of the reinforcements arrived in Yorktown from one to two days before I reached its vicinity. Johnston himself arrived there the day before I did." Gen. Heintzelman, whose division was the first to arrive before Yorktown, testifies that a few days after he landed at Fortress Monroe (March 23) he got information that Gen. Magruder had a small force only, not exceeding 10,000 men, on the Peninsula, but he further testifies: "By the time we got to Yorktown (April 5) their army had been largely reinforced *there.* Gen. McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe April 2, *ten days after Heintzelman.*

On *this information* Gen. McClellan acted—he could not act upon any other, and better evidence than Gen. Magruder's report will be required to show that this information was incorrect.

The future historian of this great rebellion will gather from all sources of information all the facts, carefully collate them, and record the results; but, at this time, it cannot be admitted that judgment upon the performances and character of our generals should be pronounced upon testimony derived from rebel official reports. Indeed the very circulation of these reports has been prohibited by a military order in some, if not all, the departments of our military service. Those who take the trouble to examine will find conflicting statements of facts in the reports of our commanding generals, and the reports of commanding rebel generals, and in no one particular is there so strong a motive to vary from strict accuracy of statement as in giving the numbers engaged. Through all time the habit of commanding generals has been to understate their own numerical force, and exaggerate the force of their enemies, when giving accounts of battles which have been fought, or conflicts terminated. It cannot be supposed that such a man as Gen. Magruder would be an honorable exception to this custom. Even Gen. Lee, the commander of the purest character in the

rebel service, in giving an account of the battle of Gettysburg, would not be believed by loyal men in preference to Gen. Meade, our own commander. Much less ought the testimony of Gen. Magruder to out-weigh that of Gen. McClellan.

I shall conclude these numbers in my next.

No. XXIII.—Part I.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

On the 7th July, 1862, the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were near Harrison's Landing, Virginia, the seven days' fight was ended, the rebels were in front with the purpose of overwhelming our army by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blocking our communications on the James River. The position of our army was one of peril. Up to this date General McClellan had communicated with the President of the United States and the Secretary of War on military subjects only. On this day he sent a letter to the President, laying before him, for his private consideration, his general views concerning the then existing state of the rebellion. These views, the general says, "amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed on my mind and heart."

It has been objected that the general had no right to send such a letter, although a private one, to his superior in command, the chief executive of the country. There is no evidence that the President himself ever made this objection, but some of his zealous friends have done so. These friends betray ignorance of the character and spirit of our republican institutions. The President is not a monarch or ruler of any sort by hereditary right; he is an agent of the people, chosen by them to execute specified duties under the constitution. Every citizen in the land is one of his constituents, and has a personal interest in the government of the country which the President is chosen to administer for a limited period. It is the people's government, to be administered for their benefit. There is not one of these people who has not the right respectfully to submit his views to the President, upon any subject of public interest. This no man will deny, and if George B. McClellan had been, on the 7th of July, 1862, a private citizen, an unofficial person, his right to communicate his views to the President, or any other officer of the government, would be unquestioned. But because George B. McClellan was an officer of the government, subordinate to the President, it is alleged that he has forfeited the right which would clearly have been his as a private citizen. If the general had submitted his views to the President in a spirit of insubordination, that is, in the manifestation of a spirit that denied the authority of his superior, the objection would have been valid; but when the communication is perfectly respectful, and made evidently with a desire to promote the general welfare, and dictated by strong convictions of duty, who can rightly censure it? The captain of a ship is supreme in his command; his authority cannot be questioned; but if, in a time of great peril, the mate of the same ship should respectfully suggest to him a course to be steered, and what sails ought to be taken in, and what other sails ought to be set, in order to save the ship and cargo, who can say that such a subordinate officer ought to be censured? Especially if the suggestion was made privately, and not in the presence of the crew; and more especially if the mate happened to be one of the owners of the ship and cargo? I shall not attempt further to argue or illustrate this point: Gen. McClellan had a perfect right to send to the President just such a letter as he did send, if, in his judgment, after mature reflection, it contained what he deemed useful and timely advice. Had he failed to send it, he would have fallen short of his duty as an American citizen and a military commander

Let us next see what advice he gave the President. Gen. McClellan says: "*Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institu-*

tions and self government." This declaration is too plain to require explanation or illustration.

The general also says: "*The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost, in time, treasure and blood.*"

Time was when this declaration would have received not only the assent, but the hearty commendation of every loyal American citizen. Then we all loved the Constitution—we were proud of it: but the time is when many American citizens, professing loyalty more loudly than their neighbors, can see no beauty in this Constitution, and are willing to discard it, or mar it, so as to leave it no longer the frame of government which it was designed to be by the illustrious men who made it, and the people, our predecessors, who adopted it. Gen. McClellan is not one of these new lights; he regards the Union as indispensable to the preservation of populuar liberty, and the Constitution as the only clear and well defined, thoroughly understood bond of that Union to which the people have given their assent. The manner in which free institutions shall exist, and by which they have existed, is here a matter of agreement. The government which exists and can only exist by the consent of the governed, is embodied in the Constitution, and the only mode by which this government can be altered or varied is prescribed in the Constitution itself. If this Constitution is stripped of its sanctions, it is impossible to predict what substitute will receive the consent of the governed. or how that consent will be obtained. Without a constition which has been adopted by the people, we have no government, and are in a state of anarchy; out of which it is not given human foresight to scan what form of government will arise.

The general further says: "*Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake our settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.*"

This is simply declaring that the whole people of the United States, loyal and disloyal, must be governed, protected, or punished *by law*, sovereign law. All are entitled to the protection which the law provides—all who violate the law must be punished according to law. These propositions are simple expressions of elementary truths. To the mind of all enlightened in the principles which govern and preserve society, they are elementary truths; an attempt to prove them would only cloud them with obscurity. Yet a doctrine has gained currency, even among some respectable people, that rebels are entitled to no protection, or advantage from the laws which they have violated, and the Constitution which they have cast off. How can these rebels be punished? Who shall prescribe that punishment? By what rule shall it be meted out? The answer to each of these questions is the same, and is very simple. The offence to be punished consists in the violation of the will and decrees of the community; this will and these decrees find their only expression and embodiment *in law*. No power on earth but the community whose law has been violated has a right to punish that violation, and that community can only utter its voice in form *of law*—therefore punishment must be prescribed by law. In a Christian community it will not be denied that all men have violated the law of God, and except these violaters of the law have thrown away their weapons of rebellion, they are all rebels against the government of God. Yet what child born of Christian parents does not know that these rebels will be judged by the law which they have violated, and trampled under their feet? "Did not Moses give you the law and yet none of you keepeth the law?" "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he doeth?"

Nothing can be more clear than that General McClellan's policy, recommended in the strongest manner to the President, was to put down the military resistance to the government

by force of arms. But that policy looked beyond the suppression of the military combinations of rebels, to a re-establishment of the authority of government over all the people within the territorial limits of the United States. When the victory of arms is made complete then the operation of moral causes must be relied upon to unite the people of the whole country. The sword must not be the sole reliance to accomplish a reunion, but the olive branch must be held out.

Let us now refer to the moral instrumentalities the employment of which the geneeral recommends. They are:

"This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded: and it should be conducted on the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespasses sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrest should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded or received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, excepting for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permamently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

"This principle might be extended upon the grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumissions in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

"A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty."

Here we have a delineation of the the policy which alone can restore peace to the country. It may not be practicable at this time to pursue literally this line of policy, but the spirit which dictated it is that which must guide the action of the government if we would have p ace. There is nothing new in the policy here recommended, for it is substantially the same as that announced by the President in his inaugural address, and which was embodied in the Crittenden resolutions adopted by both houses of Congress. This was the policy of the beginning of the contest, and which called forth volunteers unprecedented in numbers, inspired by a patriotic zeal of the most intense fervor. To gather an army then it was not necessary to offer bounties to soldiers the most tempting ever presented to swell the ranks of an army, which has gone far to exhaust the resources of the country. Had that policy not been changed, but persevered in, faithfully, the contest would have been ended long ere this. But it was changed, and the new policy adopted of the universal

abolition of slavery by the Federal Government. Hence the war has been prolonged, and will be prolonged until the government returns to the point whence it departed, under the pressure brought to bear upon the President by the outside influence of a few noisy, zealous, persistent radical men, who were not, and are not, the true friends of the Constitution made by our fathers, and which, at this moment, is the fundamental law of the land.

No. XXIII.—Part II.
AMALGAMATION.

That Constitution recognized a distinction between the white race and the descendants of the African race in this country, and did not admit the latter to equal privileges with the former. The effort now is to abolish that distinction, and place the two races upon the same footing, politically. This effort, if successful, must, as a necessary consequence, lead to the blending of the two races, as races have been blended, dwarfed and demoralized, in Mexico and more Southern latitudes. To this complexion the American people are not willing to come, but they revolt at it. Yet the purpose to reach this result is now openly avowed, and defended by the same persons whose influence led the President to change the policy originally avowed by him for the suppression of the rebellion.

A work has lately appeared entitled "Miscegenation; the Theory of the Blending of the Races as applied to the American Whiteman and Negro," in which such blending is warmly recommended. In the appendix to the work, extracts from the testimony of Wendell Phillips, and the testimony of Theodore Tilton are given, showing the same earnestness and zeal in support of this theory as they have heretofore shown in the anti-slavery cause, and maintaining that such blending is the necessary sequence to abolition. If the Republican party should succeed at the next election, the abolition section of that party will confidently assert that the American people have decided in favor of the political equality and amalgamation of the white and negro races, and the other section will not deny it. It will then be insisted that the descendants of Africa shall, equally with the whites, be eligible to seats in the jury box, and on the bench of the judiciary, and in the legislatures of the several States, and in the Congress of the United States. Next will follow amalgamation of blood. It remains to be seen whether the free white race of the country is prepared for this change.

Although the President has changed, Gen. McClellan has not changed; he stands, to-day, committed to the policy which he proclaimed in his address to the Union men of Western Virginia, on the 26th of March, 1861, months before he was called to Washington to command the Army of the Potomac. In that address he says: "I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio river. They come as your friends and brothers—as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families and your property shall be under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected, notwithstanding all that has been said by traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves. Understand one thing clearly; not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt on their part."

Such was the policy he proclaimed to the world before he was called by the President, with the hearty approval of the nation, to be general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Western Virginia afterwards proclaimed her fidelity to the Union. But the utterance of these sentiments was remembered by the radical abolitionists of the country, who early conspired, and perseveringly labored to destroy the man who avowed them, until their influence exiled him from command, and their bitter hatred still pursues him, for no other reason but his firm adherence to the principles which guided him in re-entering, when called upon, the military service of

his country. Abraham Lincoln has suffered himself to be pushed and turned aside from every purpose which he avowed upon entering on the duties of President of the United States. A recent document has appeared under his own hand, being a letter bearing date the 4th April ultimo, addressed to A. G. Hodges, Esq., Frankfort, Kentucky, in which he acknowledges, vindicates, and attempts to justify this change. In this document he admits that he took an oath to preserve the Constitution, yet, in effect, affirms that it was impossible to keep this oath without losing the nation. He maintains "that measures otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. RIGHT OR WRONG," he declares, "I ASSUMED THIS GROUND, AND NOW AVOW IT." This is a bold avowal to be made by the chief magistrate of a republic, as much obligated to obey the law as the humblest citizen in the country. This right or wrong doctrine is certainly a very dangerous one to teach the people of the country. What was it that RIGHT OR WRONG the President resolved to do, and actually accomplished? Nothing, on the first breaking out of the rebellion, when possibly summary measures by the power which alone, in the absence of Congress, controlled the government, might, by general consent, have been justified. But this right or wrong action was taken after Congress assembled, and time had been afforded to provide, by legislation, for the wants of the country in the exigency which then existed. "After the months of March and May, 1862," he says, "he was, in his judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or laying strong hand upon the colored element." The meaning of this is, that he was compelled, as the executive power of the government, to abrogate the relation of master and slave, or the Union and the Constitution must perish. Admitting for the present that if there had been sufficient grounds in the actual state of facts existing at the time to drive the President to this alternative, he would have been justified in the decision he made, the important question arises, What were these causes? Who would have compelled the destruction of the Union and the Constitution if the President had not laid a strong hand upon the colored element? It is very certain the rebels had not the power to accomplish this result. The declaration, by whomsoever made, that the rebels possessed this power, would not be believed. There had been no evidence given whatever that the numerical force of the free white loyal citizens of the country was not sufficient to put down the rebellion. But there had been melancholy evidence that the Administration had not the wisdom to direct that force, or, having the wisdom, it did not wish to terminate the rebellion, until an ulterior object—the abolition of slavery—had been accomplished. Some of the best men in the country believe that this was the policy which guided the conduct of the Administration, and there are not a few Republicans who, believing, justify it.

I am not willing to believe, for I have not sufficient evidence of the fact, that the President himself has not at all times been willing and desirous of bringing the war to a close by subduing the enemy; but I have what I deem sufficient evidence that prominent members of his own party, near to his person, had no desire that Gen. McClellan should take Richmond, but, on the contrary, labored to prevent such conquest, and that these persons so operated by their influence on the President as to make him an instrument in carrying out their designs. This I charge.

The rebels had it not in their power to destroy the Union if the negroes had not been emancipated, or if they had not been enrolled in the army. It is a gross libel upon the white population in the loyal States to affirm that they were not sufficiently numerous, patriotic and brave, to conquer the military force of the rebels without the aid of the negroes. What was it,

then, that compelled the President, "right or wrong," to lay a strong hand upon the colored element? Was this measure rendered necessary by the threatened interference of one or more foreign powers in our domestic affairs? If it were, and our government was awed by that threat, our condition is mortifying in the extreme, and the people are entitled to know what nation or nations have thus humbled us. If the rebels themselves could not do it, nor the interference of foreign nations, there is only one other power which could exercise an influence to destroy the nation if the President had declined to avail himself of the negro element to preserve it. That power was the President's own party. The leading influence of that party might have demanded that the President, right or wrong, should use the power of the Executive to destroy slavery, and threatened, if he did not do so, they would abandon the government. The enemies who would have destroyed the government in the contingency supposed, must have been the abolitionists. It is well known that these abolitionists were no friends of the Constitution; that they had been trying, for a number of years, to weaken the regard and reverence of the people for that Constitution. If this was the power—and I suspect it was—that compelled the President, in order to preserve the Union, to lay a strong hand upon the colored element, the people of the country ought to know it. They ought to know who the real traitors in the loyal States are. Pray, Mr. Lincoln, enlighten the public on this point; favor that same public with another letter under your own signature.

The President asserts, with much confidence, that he has made no loss, but a great gain, by laying his hand on the colored element. It shows, he says, a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen and laborers. In stating the account of loss and gain resulting from measures adopted and carried out by the President, in respect to what he calls the colored element, many items ought to be inserted which his Excellency has not probably thought of. 1st. He has made the negro a soldier. Now there is no fact more clearly demonstrated, and thoroughly known, than that, in this country, the negro is regarded by the white man as his inferior; he considers himself degraded by an association with the negro. There is another fact, well established, that the fellowship in arms is one of a peculiarly honorable and endearing character. By the measure adopted the negro is made the fellow soldier of the white man. It ought to be considered how this forced fellowship will operate upon the morale of the American white soldier; will it not impair his self respect? Must he not feel degraded by the company he is compelled to keep? If these results are inevitable, will the white soldier fight as well, will he accomplish as much, in such company? There is but one anwer to this question—*he will not.*

Again. The negro is not as courageous as the white man; he does not possess the same mental resources; he is more easily frightened, and, when frightened, he will run; he will flee from the face of an enemy; his fear may easily become contagious in the ranks of an army, and thus a panic may be excited. It is therefore by no means certain that an addition of 130,000 negroes to an army of white men is so many clear gain. On the contrary, this addition may be, in fact, a loss.

2d. The President by his proclamation has dissolved or attempted to dissolve the legal relation of master and slave in States in rebellion, not within our military lines. The object of this proclamation was to deprive the master of the service of his slave, and excite him to hostility against his master. There are thousands of true and loyal men who deny the right of the President to do this act, and in contests between the negro and American white men, once their fellow citizens, although in rebellion, their sympathy, their natural sympathy—for it is a sympathy of race and caste—is with the white man. There is no disputing

these facts, and their influence operates to divide the loyal men of the country, and thereby to weaken the power of our government; while the same facts unite, nerve, exasperate, and make desperate the enemy. These facts, in the account credited with 130,000 negro soldiers, are to be placed per contra, on the other side.

The truth is the President's mode of dealing with the colored "element," has been unfortunate in the extreme. So far from being indispensable to the preservation of the legitimate government of the country, it has been most influential in strengthening and inspiring hopes of perpetuity to the illegitimate Confederate government. The traitorous leaders of that government could not have suggested measures better calculated to unite the people upon whom it relied for support. These leaders justified the rebellion which they inaugurated by confident and earnest declarations that the Federal government intended to destroy their property in slaves; the Union loving men in the South, relying upon our solemn protestations that such was not our purpose, are pointed to these measures of the President as a fulfillment of these predictions.

On the other hand the sympathizers with secession among ourselves, for there are such, point to the same measures to show that the abolitionists, never friends of the Constitution, have gained the point for which they have been striving through a long course of years—the abolition of slavery, right or wrong. The secessionist and abolitionists have thus succeeded in breaking down or sensibly impairing the organic law, the Constitution of the country. How infinitely better it would have been, in dealing with the colored element, to follow the advice of General McClellan. "Military power should (he says) not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of the goverment to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized."

"This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and probably even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time."

It remains to be seen whether the people of this country will set their seal of approbation upon a policy which, instead of seeking, as its ultimate object, the suppression of the rebellion, aims to abolish, throughout the country, the institution of slavery, without the consent of the States in which that institution exists, and to elevate the African race to a political equality with the white race.

President Lincoln's views on these points have been clearly avowed, and his determination to enforce them, right or wrong, has been carried into practical operation.

General McClellan's views have also been clearly made known; he has declared them to amount to convictions deeply impressed upon his mind and heart, and, as we have seen, they are "*That the Constitution and Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood.*" He would "*also enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.*" He has expressed his belief "that the Constitution gives power sufficient even for the present exigency.' The thought of violating the Constitution, in letter or spirit, by an usurpation of power, has never been permitted to enter his mind.

Thus have I concluded this series of numbers—their purpose has been declared, and I respectfully, yet confidently, submit that it has been shown to be a fair deduction from the evidence before the country:—

1st. That General McClellan, if he had been sustained by the government, according to promise, would have taken Richmond.

2d. That there was no sound or valid reason for withholding the force promised for his support, and

3d. That he did the best he could, or that any other general could under the circumstances, with the forces placed under his command; and

Lastly, That General McClellan has been deeply injured by the Administration.

INDEX.

	Page
Author's reasons for publishing	3
First Proposition.—General McClellan would have captured Richmond, if not interfered with by the President	4
Prince de Joinville's testimony	4
General McDowell's force withheld; this deranged the whole plan of the campaign	4
General Fitz John Porter takes Hanover Court House	4
Further testimony of De Joinville	5
Testimony of General Franklin	5
Testimony of General Hunt	5
Second Proposition.—No good reasons for withholding McDowell's command	5
The reason that this command was required for the protection of Washington—not supported by facts or sound opinions	6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Third Proposition.—The original plan being deranged, General McClellan did the best he could with the forces under his command	12
Yorktown	12 to 20
McClellan meets a force numerically equal to his own	13
Two general principles adopted by General McClellan	13
His opinions of the power and skill of the enemy	13
Charge—that McClellan spent too much time before Yorktown, refuted by the evidence	14
Prince de Joinville's testimony	14

General McClellan's testimony 14
General Barnard's testimony 14
General Keyes 14
General Fitz John Porter 15
General Heintzelman 15
General Hooker 15
Rules of Evidence 20, 21
President, though commander in chief, not expected to take command of armies—
Constitutional doctrine on this point 20, 21
From Yorktown to Williamsburg ..... 21 to 24
From Williamsburg to Chickahominy ..... 24 to 28
General Hooker's testimony 24
General Keyes' testimony 24
General McClellan's testimony 25
Prince de Joinville's testimony 26
Before Richmond ..... 28 to 32
General Barnard's testimony as to Napoleon's maxims 30
Condition of the Chickahominy 30
General Howard's opinion 31
Numbers from II to XII run together through inadvertance of the press 31
No. XII. 31
No. XIII.—Fair Oaks ..... 32 to 36
Questions Answered.—What could the General have done to-day which he did not do? 33
What has he left undone to-day which he might have done? 33
Prince de Joinville's testimony 33
Senator Chandler 34
B. Estvan's (colonel in Confederate army) testimony 35
Question Considered.—Ought the left wing of our army to have followed the Rebel army into Richmond? 35
General Heintzelman's testimony 35
General Hooker's testimony 36
General Keyes' testimony 36
General McClellan's testimony 36
No. XIV.—Gross Injustice of the Committee ..... 36 to 37
Summary Review 37

lard's History of the War 38
at was the force of the enemy when General McClellan reached Yorktown..... 38
neral McClellan's testimony 38, 39
. XV.—Before Richmond 39
neral Hunt's testimony..... 39
neral Keyes' testimony 40
legrams 40, 41
. XVI.—Change of Base 41
neral McClellan's testimony 42
hy the battle of Gains' Mill was lost? 43
nference between Generals McClellan and Heintzelman..... 43, 44
. XVII.—Comments on the passage in the President's letter to General McClellan. "It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame."
neral Hitchcock first gave the President the alarm as to the safety of Washington 45
. XVIII.—State of things on the Peninsula at the moment McClellan was forced to change his position 46
o. XIX.—Change of Base 47
cClellan's Report 47
o act of the war has shed more honor on our arms than the manner of changing base 48
ollard's testimony..... 48
r. Motley's (Minister at Vienna) testimony 49
enophon's retreat; Moreau's retreat; Commodore Hull's retreat..... 50
o. XX.—Order to leave the Peninsula..... 50
eneral McClellan's remonstrance 50
eneral McClellan in favor of destroying the military power of the rebellion..... 52
ualities of a great general. Burke's description..... 52, 53
eneral Grant..... 53
o. XXI.—New York Times..... 54
o. XXII.—New York Times..... 58
o. XXIII.—Part I. General McClellan's letter to the President, dated July 7, 1862.. 61
bjection answered that the General had no right to send this letter..... 61
dvice given by General McClellan to the President..... 61, 62, 63
he policy which can alone restore peace to the country 63
o. XXIII.—Part II. Amalgamation 64
Vork on Miscegenation..... 64

The President has changed his policy, but General McClellan has not changed 64
President's letter of 4th April, 1864, to A. G. Hodges 65
President's RIGHT or WRONG doctrine considered 65
General Deductions 67, 86